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Price, Path & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion 
Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary 
Investigation) 
Jonathan C. Lipson† 
This Article provides a qualitative empirical analysis of third-party closing 
opinion practice. This practice has recently generated some controversy 
because, among other reasons, many of the transactions at issue in Enron were 
supported by closing opinions. Interviews with lawyers around the nation 
suggest that the traditional academic view of opinion practice—that it 
promotes economic efficiency—is helpful but incomplete. Many features of 
closing opinion practice persist despite perceived inefficiencies. Moreover, 
non-market actors, such as the bar associations—not private innovation—
appear to be the chief engines of improvement. Based on these interviews, the 
Article offers some initial thoughts as to why the practice exists and what 
functions it may perform. 
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Price, Path & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion 
Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary 
Investigation) 
Jonathan C. Lipson 
 
“Too much time, effort and money are expended on third-party legal 
opinions.”1 
“In rendering legal opinions, lawyers conduct themselves as if their 
professional lives were on the line.”2 
“A legal opinion hits nerve centers in every direction.”3 
“When I want your opinion, I’ll give it to you.”4 
INTRODUCTION 
Why do lawyers ask for and give third-party closing opinions? 
Few practices among U.S. lawyers are more curious—or (curiously) less 
studied by legal scholars5—than this. Third-party closing opinions are writings 
 
1. Business Law Section of the State Bar of California, Report on Third-Party Remedies Opinions 
(2004), at 1, available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sections/buslaw/opinions/2005-
01_remedies-opinion.pdf [hereinafter California 2004 Report]. 
2. SCOTT FITZGIBBON & DONALD W. GLAZER, LEGAL OPINIONS § 1.1, at 4 (1992). This leading 
work on third-party closing opinions has been superseded by a second edition, DONALD W. GLAZER ET 
AL., GLAZER AND FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL OPINIONS IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2d ed. 2001). [I will 
refer to the first edition as “FITZGIBBON, OPINIONS,” and the second edition and its 2006 Cumulative 
Supplement as “GLAZER, OPINIONS.”]. 
3. James Fuld, Lawyers’ Standards and Responsibilities in Rendering Opinions, 33 BUS. LAW. 
1295, 1316 (1978). 
4. Samuel Goldwyn (quoted in http://www.cinerhama.com/jewish/goldwyn.html) (last visited Jan. 
11, 2006). 
5. There has never been a full-blown theoretical or empirical attempt to understand this odd and 
important artifact of legal practice. There have been several useful articles that consider opinion practice 
in passing. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE. L.J. 239, 274-77 (1984); Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as 
Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 679 (1996). A 1992 article in the University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review considered 
how legal opinions might be used in the law school classroom. See Bryn Vaaler, Bridging the Gap: 
Legal Opinions as an Introduction to Business Lawyering, 61 UMKC L. REV. 23 (1992). Moreover, 
Professor Schwarcz has recently offered a defense of lawyers issuing opinions in one type of transaction, 
structured financings. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured 
Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2005). There is also a rich body of doctrinal and practical literature 
discussed in Part I, infra. Yet, there has (until now) been little effort to ask the most basic question: Why 
do lawyers engage in this practice at all? 
 Why academics have failed to study it is easier to understand. To the extent that academics will have 
practiced law, they are unlikely to have had a transactional practice, much less one at a level of 
sophistication involving the requesting or giving of third-party closing opinions. See generally Richard 
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(typically in the form of a letter) from the lawyer to one party in a transaction 
(e.g., the borrower) to the other party (e.g., the lender).6 At their simplest, 
closing opinions focus on three matters: (1) the “authority” of the subject of the 
opinion (the “Company”) to engage in the transaction, (2) the enforceability of 
the transaction contracts against the Company, and (3) assurances that the 
transaction (and perhaps the Company) is not in violation of any applicable law 
or contract. 
While the volume of third-party closing opinions is difficult to gauge, they 
are viewed as a “fixture of the American legal scene,”7 and are routinely 
delivered in financings, mergers and acquisitions, stock issuances, and other 
large, complex transactions.8 A recent bar association report observed that 
“every week . . . hundreds, if not thousands, of third[-]party legal opinions are 
delivered at closings for business transactions.”9 Yet, lawyers frequently 
complain that opinions create needless costs and risk without adding much 
value. Thus, opinion-writing poses a simple question: why have it at all? 
The explanation thus far has principally been economic: closing opinions 
ostensibly reduce information asymmetries by compelling the production and 
verification of information that enables parties to price their transactions more 
 
E. Redding, “Where Did You Go to Law School?” Gatekeeping for the Professoriate and Its 
Implications for Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 594, 596 (2003). That academics have not 
engaged in the practice does not—and should not—render it less curious and worthy of study. 
6. See The TriBar Opinion Committee, Third-Party “Closing” Opinions, 53 BUS. LAW. 592, 606 
(1998) (“At the closing of many business transactions, counsel for one party to the transaction will 
deliver a letter to the other party expressing its conclusions on various matters of legal concern to that 
other party.”) [hereinafter TriBar 1998 Report]. This report, as well as many others, was authored by the 
“TriBar Committee,” a committee of lawyers devoted to developing standards in closing opinion 
practice. The TriBar Committee has “exercised great influence over the years, due not only to the 
importance of New York in capital markets, but also to the consistent high quality of its work product.” 
See Ad Hoc Committee on Third-Party Legal Opinions, Business Law Section of the Washington State 
Bar Association, Report on Third-Party Legal Opinion Practice in the State of Washington, at 4 n.3 
(1998) (reprinted in GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, at app. 2) [hereinafter Washington State Report]. 
The TriBar Committee’s original contribution was Legal Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier 
Path, 34 BUS. LAW. 1891 (1979) [hereinafter TriBar 1979 Report]. Other TriBar efforts include 
An Addendum—Legal Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier Path, 36 BUS. LAW. 429 (1981); 
Second Addendum to Legal Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier Path, 44 BUS. LAW. 563 (1989); 
Special Report of the TriBar Opinion Committee: The Remedies Opinion, 46 BUS. LAW. 959 
(1991). The TriBar’s most recent contribution is the Special Report of the TriBar Opinion 
Committee: The Remedies Opinion—Deciding When to Include Exceptions and Assumptions, 59 
BUS. LAW. 1483 (2004) [hereinafter TriBar Remedies Report]. The background of the TriBar 
Committee is discussed in Part IV.A.2, infra. 
7. GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 1.1, at 2. 
8. A recent report by the Business Law Section of the California Bar Association observed, based 
on an informal study, that the enforceability term of the closing opinion letter (sometimes called a 
remedies opinion) is “almost always requested by lenders in loan transactions exceeding $100 million.” 
California 2004 Report, supra note 1, app. 4, at 1 n.4. This report indicates that the enforceability 
opinion is given in merger and acquisition transactions involving $10 million or more (at least among 
privately-held companies) and in many private securities transactions. Id. 
9. Committee on Legal Opinions, ABA Section of Business Law, Law Office Opinion Practices, 60 
BUS. LAW. 327 (2004) [hereinafter Opinion Practices]. 
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accurately.10 In the vernacular, closing opinions are part of the “due diligence” 
process that occurs in most business transactions.11 Yet, the evidence, which 
includes interviews with lawyers around the country, tells a more complex 
story.12 On the one hand, attorneys acknowledge that certain aspects of certain 
opinions—in particular the opinions on authority and the absence of 
impediments to the deal—may add value in just this information-enhancing 
way. Moreover, and more subtly, lawyers routinely speak about the role of 
closing opinions in economic terms. For example, a recent report of the 
Business Law Section of the State Bar of California on the enforceability 
opinion—often the most controversial portion of the closing opinion—
explicitly calls for the creation of a “cost-benefit framework for determining 
the appropriateness of requesting an enforceability opinion in a transaction.”13 
On the other hand, the economic explanation is incomplete for at least three 
reasons. First, unscrupulous clients have perpetrated famous financial frauds 
despite the issuance of closing opinions, suggesting that they may not produce 
important information when it matters most. For example, Judge Harmon, 
presiding over the securities fraud suits against Enron’s lawyers,14 and the 
Enron examiner,15 both characterized legal opinions as important in the chain 
of alleged wrongdoing. 
Nor is Enron unique. Famous frauds in the National Student Marketing 
 
10. See Gilson, supra note 5, at 275-76. As discussed further below, Gilson developed in this article 
a view that lawyers are (or should be) “transaction cost engineers” who “devis[e] efficient mechanisms 
which bridge the gap between capital asset pricing theory’s hypothetical world of perfect markets and 
the less-than-perfect reality of effecting transactions in this world.” Id. at 255. 
11. “When received, the closing opinion serves as a part of the recipient’s diligence, providing the 
recipient with the opinion giver’s professional judgment on legal issues concerning the opinion giver’s 
client, the transaction, or both, that the recipient has determined to be important in connection with the 
transaction.” See Committee on Legal Opinions, Guidelines for the Preparation of Closing Opinions, 57 
BUS. LAW. 875, § 1.1, at 875 (2002) [hereinafter ABA 2002 Guidelines]; see also Committee on Legal 
Opinions, Third-Party Legal Opinion Report, Including the Legal Opinion Accord of the Section of 
Business Law, American Bar Association, 47 BUS. LAW. 167 (1991) [hereinafter Accord]. The ABA 
promulgated in the Accord a series of guidelines on opinion practice, later supplemented by the ABA 
2002 Guidelines. [hereinafter ABA 1991 Guidelines]. 
12. The methodology of these interviews is described in the Appendix to this Article. In order to 
preserve the confidentiality of the records, while maintaining the integrity of the data, I have identified 
the attorneys in code, and will cite to the transcripts of the interviews in the following manner: 
“Interview with Attorney A-1 (date), transcript at [ ].” 
13. California 2004 Report, supra note 1, at 1, 6 (“[T]he benefits [of a remedies opinion] must 
warrant the time and expense required to prepare the opinion.”), app. 4. 
14. The opinions at issue in the Enron case appear to have been “true sale” or “true issuance” 
opinions, which are elaborations on the more generic authority, enforceability, and no-violations 
opinions. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Lit., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (denying law firm’s 
motion to dismiss charges of primary violations under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
because, among other things, the firm “drafted ‘true sales’ opinions that Lead Plaintiff asserts were 
essential to affect many of the allegedly fraudulent transactions.”). It is not clear that these were third-
party opinions, at least in a conventional sense. The role that closing opinions played in the Enron case 
is discussed in Parts II.B & III.C, infra. 
15. See In re Enron Corp., Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, at 48-55, app. 
C, at 179-202, annex 1, at 25-31 (on file with author) [hereinafter Enron Final Report]. 
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Corp.16 and OPM17 cases, among others, were also perpetrated despite the 
presence of third-party closing opinions.18 These cases suggest that, in the right 
(or wrong) circumstances, closing opinions may not merely fail to deter fraud; 
they may actually abet it, especially if the lawyer has given the opinion 
knowing of the client’s malfeasance. 
Second, even without fraud, lawyers acknowledge that closing opinion 
practice often fails to enhance in a cost-effective way the quality or quantity of 
information produced. Closing opinions are usually heavily qualified and, in 
the case of the enforceability opinion, typically require the less-expert lawyer to 
offer the opinion, even though he or she would not be its “least-cost” producer. 
A number of lawyers observe that closing opinions often serve little purpose at 
all; they are given simply because they are “on the checklist.”19 Lawyers thus 
suggest that opinion practice may exist in its current form for purposes less 
wholesome than the production of information. It may exist, for example, as a 
kind of “deal insurance” by exposing the opining attorney to potential liability 
if the deal has failed and there turns out to be a defect in the opinion.20 
Third, and most curiously, opinion practice appears to resist market-based 
change. This is surprising, since Gilson’s economic model would predict that 
negotiated transactions should result in enhanced efficiencies over time. Thus, 
clients and lawyers should waive or modify third-party closing opinions to the 
extent that they do not add informational value. Yet, while it appears that the 
market does play some role in the development of opinion practice, it also 
appears that the chief engines of adaptation are bar associations, which produce 
voluminous reports and forms which solve problems that the market does not or 
cannot fix.21 This suggests that, so far as the market is concerned, the costs of 
private innovation in this context are perceived to be more than the resulting 
gains.22 
Why might that be? Although the evidence is preliminary and qualitative 
(and therefore subjective), it appears that non-economic social forces, not just 
the market, shape closing opinion practice. Interviews with attorneys suggest 
 
16. See SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). 
17. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 304-08 (3d ed. 1999) 
(discussing Report of the Trustee Concerning Fraud and Other Misconduct in the Management of the 
Affairs of the Debtor, In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., No. 81 B 10553 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 
1983)). 
18. See Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 1017, 1046-67 (2004) (discussing frauds in these cases). 
19. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
20. Cf. GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 1.3.2, at 11 (“Another benefit sometimes ascribed—
wrongly—to an opinion letter is that it serves as an insurance policy.”). 
21. Exactly how influential these reports are is an empirical question that might be addressed in a 
future survey of a broader group of practitioners than was interviewed for this Article. 
22. Cf. Gilson, supra note 5, at 253 (“As long as the costs of innovation are less than the resulting 
gains, private innovation to reduce the extent of market failure creates value.”). 
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that inefficiencies in closing opinion practice might stem from its path-
dependent character (e.g., opinions are given simply because they are on “the 
checklist”), as well as the “pride”—assertions of self and status—of the lawyers 
(and clients) involved in (or affected by) the practice.23 Thus, the title of this 
Article: “Price, Path and Pride.” The thesis of the Article is that we can only 
begin to understand third-party closing opinion practice in the United States by 
recognizing that it reflects both economic (price) and non-economic (path and 
pride) considerations. 
Closing opinions are likely to become more, not less, controversial in the 
coming years. Many of the lawyers interviewed for this project said that they 
thought that lawyers were becoming increasingly attractive litigation targets 
when transactions failed, and that opinion letters would form an important link 
in the chain leading to liability. Moreover, pressure to create increasingly 
complex transaction structures24 will likely demand that lawyers issue more, 
perhaps riskier, closing opinions. If the trend identified by the lawyers 
interviewed for this project bears out, lawyers may have far greater exposure 
than they are prepared to absorb. 
This Article has four major Parts and an appendix that describes the 
empirical methods used. Part I summarizes Professor Gilson’s theory of legal 
opinion practice, and uses it to propose a framework for analyzing closing 
opinions. Parts II and III apply this framework to lawyers’ observations about 
those aspects of opinion practice that (respectively) do and do not add value. 
Part IV develops a supplemental explanation based on the practice’s path-
dependent and socially-contingent nature. The Article concludes with 
suggestions for further work in this important but comparatively under-studied 
area. 
I. PRICE—A THEORY OF VALUE 
To date, the principal explanation for closing opinion practice has been 
economic: third-party closing opinions exist because, like other aspects of 
business lawyering, they should provide value to the parties in excess of the 
cost of their preparation. The challenge, however, is that while “[a]ll legal 
opinions add cost to transactions . . . not all legal opinions add commensurate 
value.”25 Given the ubiquity of opinion practice, it would be unusual if third-
party opinions in fact added no economic value to the transactions of which 
they are a part. How, then, might they in fact add value? 
 
23. Both concepts (path dependence and social pride) are explained in Part IV, infra. Practical 
examples of the “checklist” are discussed in, among others, JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A 
MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS (1975). 
24. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. 
25. Washington State Report, supra note 6, at 10. 
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A. Transaction Cost Engineering 
Professor Gilson’s Value Creation model is a good place to start.26 There, 
Gilson set out to answer the important and basic question: What value—if 
any—do business lawyers generally add to the transactions on which they 
work?27 If lawyers do not, in fact, add value to the transaction in the aggregate, 
their work is at best “[besides] the point”28 and possibly destroys (by 
consuming) value that would otherwise flow to the parties, themselves. 
Gilson began by considering and rejecting two common hypotheses about 
the value that business lawyers might create: (1) that a lawyer may improve her 
client’s deal, even at the expense of the other party, by redistributive 
bargaining; and (2) that a lawyer reduces regulatory costs.29 He rejected the 
first because he observed that the important economic question was not 
whether business lawyering increases a particular party’s share, but whether the 
overall value of the transaction increases due to the lawyer’s contributions. If 
business lawyers engaged only in redistributive bargaining, rational clients 
would rarely use lawyers because “net of lawyers’ fees, the surplus from the 
transaction to be divided between the clients would be smaller as a result of the 
participation of the lawyer, rather than larger.”30 He rejected the second 
explanation—regulatory arbitrage—because, he claimed, it “does not get us far 
enough.”31 There are, he argued, simply too many lawyered transactions in 
which regulation plays little role for this to be a persuasive explanation.32 
Gilson argued instead that business lawyers are “transaction cost engineers” 
who, in a variety of ways, reduce the difference between the value that capital 
assets would obtain in a perfect market (i.e., on the capital-asset pricing model) 
and the price actually agreed-to in the imperfect world that clients occupy: 
Lawyers function as transaction cost engineers, devising efficient mechanisms 
which bridge the gap between capital asset pricing theory’s hypothetical world of 
perfect markets and the less-than-perfect reality of effecting transactions in this 
 
26. See Gilson, supra note 5. Gilson’s analysis of business lawyering was at the time considered a 
new and important development. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM 397 (1985). 
27. Gilson, supra note 5, at 243 (“Precisely how do the activities of business lawyers affect 
transaction value?”). 
28. Id. Of course it is easy to imagine that clients believe that increasing their slice of the pie does 
produce value—for them. See, e.g., Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value 
Adding Contracts: A Contract Lawyer’s View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REV. 189, 
195 (1995) (“Contract lawyers, who are properly concerned only with the well being of their clients, 
frequently fail to understand that a reduction in joint costs can benefit their client perhaps because, in 
practice, many actions that increase the value of a transaction as a whole decrease the value of a 
transaction to one of the parties.”). 
29. Gilson, supra note 5, at 245-46. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 247. 
32. See id. (“[B]usiness lawyers frequently function in a world in which regulation has made few 
inroads.”). This is an empirical question that many business lawyers might challenge. 
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world. Value is created when the transactional structure designed by the business 
lawyer allows the parties to act, for that transaction, as if the assumptions on which 
capital asset pricing theory is based were accurate.33 
For Gilson, closing opinion letters are one such “efficient mechanism.” 
Gilson argued that third-party opinion letters (as with business lawyering in 
general) can reduce information asymmetries (and therefore produce value) in 
two important ways: (1) by producing information; and (2) by providing a 
bonding mechanism by which the information can be verified. 
1. Information Production 
Often, the parties will be the best producers of information about 
themselves. Thus, the seller of a business will know a great deal (or at least 
more than the buyer, ex ante) about the value of the business. Gilson, however, 
recognized that the “[p]roduction of certain information concerning the 
character of the seller’s assets and liabilities simply requires legal analysis.”34 
Thus, Gilson argued, seller’s counsel will typically provide an opinion to the 
buyer on a variety of matters relating to the sale because seller’s counsel is the 
“least-cost producer of the information in question.”35 Producing a third-party 
opinion, he argued, is simply part of the process of producing information that 
will lead to a better transaction for all. “For example,” Gilson writes: 
[D]etermination of the seller’s proper organization and continued good standing 
under state law, the appropriate authorization of the transaction by seller, the 
existence of litigation against the seller, the impact of the transaction on the seller’s 
contracts and commitments, and the extent to which the current operation of the 
seller’s business violates any law or regulation, represent the production of 
information which neither the buyer nor the seller previously had, by a third-
party—the lawyer—who is the least-cost producer [of the information].36 
 
33. Id. at 255. The “capital asset pricing” theory posits, in part, that markets will, over time, 
correctly price assets. Id. at 251. If the theory held, “business lawyers cannot increase the value of a 
transaction. Absent regulatory-based explanations, the fees charged by business lawyers would decrease 
the net value of the transaction.” Id. As Gilson acknowledges, the CAPM is not without its critics, who 
question many of its assumptions, including that its two parameters—risk and return—are the only ones 
of significance. Id. at 251 n.31 (collecting citations of criticisms of the CAPM). Nevertheless, Gilson 
argues, the value of the CAPM is “normative: It describes why the factors it specifies [i.e., risk and 
return] should count.” Id. 
34. Id. at 274. 
35. Id. at 276. 
36. Id. at 275. As discussed below, there may be problems with this description of the function of a 
legal opinion. First, an opinion that the seller’s business violates no laws or regulations would run afoul 
of the ABA’s 2002 Guidelines. See ABA 2002 Guidelines, supra note 11, § 4.3, at 880 (“[A]n opinion 
giver should not be asked for an opinion that its client is not in violation of any applicable laws or 
regulations or that its client is not in default under any of the client’s contractual obligations.”). As 
Glazer notes, “[a]n opinion on the company’s, as opposed to the transaction’s, compliance with law is 
far too broad.” GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 13.3, at 463. Second, Gilson emphasizes only the 
authority and no-violations opinions—not the more controversial enforceability opinion. As discussed in 
Part III.A, infra, it will be much harder to support a claim that the enforceability opinion given by the 
seller’s counsel creates value on this model, unless seller’s counsel also drafted the purchase and sale 
agreement. 
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The advantage of this mode of information production, Gilson argued, is 
that it “provides a non-adversarial approach to resolving the conflict” over the 
content of the opinion.37 It is non-adversarial, he argues, because “reducing the 
cost of information necessary to the correct pricing of the transaction is 
beneficial to both buyer and seller.”38 Rather than argue about many of the 
things that often concern lawyers who ask for and give opinions—the form of 
the opinion, for example—lawyers should principally be concerned with “the 
cost of producing the information” required by the transaction.39 
2. Verification—Reputation Bonding 
Third-party closing opinions may also reduce information costs in another 
way, by creating a mechanism for verifying the information produced in the 
transaction. Gilson argued that transactional techniques commonly deployed to 
verify information—indemnification provisions, hold-backs, earnouts—“are 
imperfect because they do not entirely eliminate the potential for opportunism 
inherent in one-time transactions,” such as asset sales.40 The solution, he 
suggests, lies in the reputational bond effectively posted by the lawyer. Unlike 
the parties (who may expect no future involvement with one another, and for 
whom final-period opportunism may be quite attractive), Gilson suggests that 
professionals reliably post their reputations as a bond—act as reputational 
intermediaries41—because they expect future work. “If the intermediary cheats 
in one transaction—by failing to discover or disclose seller 
misrepresentations—its reputation will suffer and, in a subsequent transaction, 
its verification will be less completely believed.”42 
Legal opinions are, according to Gilson, an important tool in creating the 
lawyer’s reputational value.43 The legal opinion would perform this function, 
Gilson argued, by having the lawyers state that they “‘are not aware of any 
factual information that would lead us to believe that the [asset purchase] 
agreement contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a fact 
necessary to make the statements made therein not misleading.’”44 This is a 
 
37. Gilson, supra note 5, at 275. As discussed below, interviews with lawyers suggest that under 
certain circumstances, negotiations over the scope of the opinion can be quite adversarial. 
38. Id. at 275-76. Although beyond the scope of this paper, it would appear that this supposes, 
among other things, the absence of strategic behavior by either or both parties. As noted below, it would 
seem that recipient’s counsel often demands provisions in opinions that do not necessarily enhance the 
information produced. 
39. Id. at 276 (“Debate over the scope of the opinion should focus explicitly on the cost of 
producing the information.”). 
40. Id. at 288-89. 
  41.   Id. at 290. 
42. See id. 
43. Id. at 291 (“[A] particular opinion often required of the seller’s lawyer . . . most prominently 
highlight[s] the reputational intermediary role played by [lawyers].”). 
44. Id. 
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curious choice because, among other reasons, it is not clear that it is an 
appropriate opinion to give in an asset sale (the type of transaction Gilson was 
describing). Rather, as the ABA’s 2002 Guidelines indicate, “such a negative 
assurance opinion . . . is unique to securities offerings . . . .”45 It is “appropriate 
only when it is required for that purpose in connection with a . . . securities 
offering . . . .”46 
Nevertheless, while this particular opinion may not be given in asset sale 
transactions, the “central characteristic” of this (or any other) legal opinion is 
said to be that “a third party who has been intimately involved in the seller’s 
production of information for the buyer does not believe the seller has misled 
the buyer.”47 By giving such an opinion, Gilson concludes, “it is quite clearly 
the lawyer’s reputation—for diligence and honesty—that is intended to be 
placed at risk.”48 
B. A Framework for Assessing Closing Opinion Value 
Taking Gilson’s analysis seriously, and applying it to what lawyers say 
about opinion writing, would be aided by the development of a framework for 
assessing the value of opinion letters. Such a framework would account for and 
develop the two basic features of Gilson’s model—information production and 
information verification. The framework I have chosen, and which I apply in 
the next part, considers three factors: (1) whether the opinion (whether a 
particular clause or the entire document) is relevant to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties (expectation factor); (2) whether the opinion is about 
matters largely within the expertise of the lawyer giving the opinion (legal 
factor); and (3) whether the specific attorney asked to provide the opinion is the 
person best suited to do so (the division of labor factor). 
The significance of the first factor is axiomatic on an economic analysis. 
Parties that are free to contract should be permitted to realize their reasonable 
expectations.49 If, however, an opinion is not relevant to these expectations, it is 
not likely to add information that has value. The second and third factors 
introduce the complexities of transacting through professional agents. The costs 
of these agents should be associated with their comparative advantage.50 To add 
 
45. ABA 2002 Guidelines, supra note 11, § 4.5, at 880. 
46. Id. 
47. Gilson, supra note 5, at 292. 
48. Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
49. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT 
LAW 1-5 (1979); see also Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 
761, 763-64 (1975). 
50. I use the term “comparative advantage” in a general sense, not in the more specialized way used 
by international law experts. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative 
Economics of International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49 (1998); cf. Economics A-Z, 
http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?LETTER=C#COMPARATIVE%20AD
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informational value, legal opinions should reflect either pure law, or facts of a 
largely legal character. If, instead, closing opinions merely regurgitate 
information that could be more cheaply (or more authoritatively) produced by 
someone else (for instance, the client), the opinion would present economic 
problems. 
II. PRICE—WHAT THE LAWYERS SAY 
Closing opinions appear to fulfill the informational aspirations of the price 
model in two respects. First, closing opinions are thought to aid the due 
diligence process. Lawyers indicate that the due authority and no-violations 
opinions often do this. Second, and emanating from the first point, closing 
opinions may perform a market-signaling function, telling the world (or at least 
others who might take an interest in the transaction) in shorthand that sufficient 
diligence occurred to enable the lawyer to give the opinion. Both functions of 
opinions add value because (and to the extent that) they produce and verify 
information that is (1) relevant to the reasonable expectations of the parties, (2) 
about matters uniquely within the expertise of a lawyer, and (3) issued by the 
attorney in the best position to do so. 
The economic explanation of closing opinions is not just important for 
theoretical reasons; it also dominates lawyers’ discussions of the practice. 
Lawyers and clients speak in consciously economic terms about the merits (or 
the lack of merits) of opinion practice. The California Bar’s 2004 Report on 
enforceability opinions, for example, orients its answers to these questions 
almost exclusively around a cost-benefit analysis, arguing that “a remedies 
opinion should only be sought when its benefit justifies its cost.”51 While 
lawyers do not exclude other explanations for the propriety and roles of 
opinions, they appear to give preference to the economic analysis. This is 
interesting both because, as discussed below, certain aspects of opinion practice 
appear to persist despite economic inefficiencies, and because non-market 
factors—in particular, the bar associations—tend to correct for (or explain) 
these inefficiencies. 
A. Due Diligence 
Information production through the due diligence process is often said to be 
the leading cause of—and cure for—third-party closing opinions. “At its best,” 
the TriBar Opinion Committee has reported, “the opinion preparation process 
can serve to clarify and improve transactions.”52 It is worth noting that this 
 
VANTAGE (“In essence, the theory of comparative advantage says that it pays countries to trade 
because they are different.”) (last visited Mar. 14, 2006). 
51. California 2004 Report, supra note 1, at 1, 6, app. 4, at 2, 4-8. 
52. TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, at 666; ABA 1991 Guidelines, supra note 11, at § I.B(2) 
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statement refers not to the opinion itself as being the instrument of clarification, 
but instead “the process” of preparing the opinion. “When received,” the ABA 
2002 Guidelines observe, “the closing opinion serves as a part of the recipient’s 
diligence, providing the recipient with the opinion giver’s professional 
judgment on legal issues concerning the opinion giver’s client, the transaction, 
or both, that the recipient has determined to be important in connection with the 
transaction.”53 Glazer and FitzGibbon, authors of a leading practitioner’s 
treatise, also indicate that closing opinions play an important role in helping 
parties manage transactional expectations.54 
Due diligence has no precise meaning. It is often associated with 
disclosures to be made in connection with securities offerings under the 
Securities Act of 1933.55 Although closing opinions are frequently rendered in 
transactions with few federal securities law implications (e.g., loans and asset 
sales), lawyers recognize the role that closing opinions play in producing 
information as part of the due diligence process. “[T]he legitimate reason [for 
an opinion],” one attorney observed, “is that somebody forces somebody to do 
the homework . . . [to m]ake sure all the i’s are dotted and the t’s are crossed 
and things like that.”56 Writing a third-party closing opinion is “not diligence in 
kind of a mechanical verification sense, but rather in the broader sense. At one 
level it is asking for a professional, independent confirmation in the way of a 
second set of eyes.”57 
Although closing opinion letters are not generally regulated, they have 
become fairly standardized in forms that are widely available. Most third-party 
closing opinions will address some or all of the three basic questions about 
 
(“[T]he proper purpose of a third-party legal opinion is to assist in the Opinion Recipient’s diligence.”); 
see also California 2004 Report, supra note 1, at 1 (“The remedies opinion, like third-party legal 
opinions generally, can serve as an important part of the opinion recipient’s ‘diligence’ about the 
transaction.”). 
53. ABA 2002 Guidelines, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 875. As noted in Part IV.B, infra, just because 
the recipient considers the information important does not mean that the opinion-giving lawyer will 
agree. Disputes about this may then ensue. 
54. GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 1.3.1, at 7 (“Receipt of a closing opinion from counsel for 
the other side is another way a party obtains information about its legal position that may bear on its 
decision to proceed with the transaction.”) (citations omitted). They emphasize, however, that the legal 
opinion “is only one of the building blocks in the opinion recipient’s due diligence. Closing opinions 
address only specific legal issues and by design do not cover many legal matters that might be of interest 
to recipients.” Id. § 1.3.1, at 8 (footnote omitted). 
55. “[D]ue diligence connotes the absence of negligence in the preparation of disclosure; in turn, 
lack of due diligence is often considered negligence.” See Donald C. Langevoort, The Statutory Basis 
for Due Diligence Under the Federal Securities Laws 11 (PLI Corp. L. and Prac. Course Handbook 
Series No. B0-00A4, 1999) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 (1975)). The due 
diligence defense under section 11(b)(3) of the 1933 Act provides that an expert, including an attorney 
issuing a legal opinion in connection with a public offering, may limit liability for material 
misrepresentations or omissions by showing that the expert made a reasonable investigation into the 
facts, and after so doing, had reason to believe and did believe that statements made in his or her portion 
of the registration statement were true and complete at the time of effectiveness. Id. at 12. 
56. Interview with Attorney W-2 (June 7, 2004), transcript at 3. 
57. Interview with Attorney K-2 (May 17, 2004), transcript at 3. 
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authority, enforceability, and violations or conflicts noted in the introduction. 
In this case, I will frequently refer to the model developed by the TriBar 
Opinion Committee in their 1998 Report.58 While this form may not be used by 
all lawyers, it nevertheless provides some baseline for discussing the contents 
of opinions.59 
1. Due Authority 
The first opinion offered in the model closing opinion will be on “due 
authority.” This opinion goes to the agency questions that must underlie any 
transaction: Does the subject of the opinion (the “Company”) exist and have the 
power and authority to do that which the deal contemplates? The first 
substantive provision of the TriBar model, for example, would have the 
opinion-giver state that “the Company is a corporation validly existing under 
the law of [the state of incorporation].”60 It is obvious why this should be 
true—if the Company does not exist, the parties will have legitimate concerns 
about its ability to engage in the transaction.61 Thus, the TriBar 1998 Report 
observes that “[this] opinion serves as a cornerstone for many of the opinions 
that follow.”62 It is a simple, uncontroversial opinion.63 
 
58. See TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, app. A-1, at 667. While I will refer principally to model 
opinions developed by the TriBar Committee, I am mindful of the fact that many lawyers view the 
TriBar Opinion Committee as having been dominated by mid-Atlantic (and in particular New York) 
lawyers, and that west coast (and in particular California) lawyers may approach opinion-writing in 
different ways. See, e.g., Interview with Attorney C-1 (May 13, 2004), transcript at 2-3 (discussing 
California-style of opinion practice); see also BUSINESS LAW SECTION OF THE STATE BAR OF 
CALIFORNIA, REPORT ON THE THIRD-PARTY LEGAL OPINION REPORT OF THE ABA SECTION OF 
BUSINESS LAW 5-8 (1992) (discussing distinctive California approach to certain aspects of 
enforceability opinions) [hereinafter California 1992 Report]. I also note, as discussed further below, 
that a significantly different approach to opinion-writing was proposed in 1991 by the Business Law 
Section of the American Bar Association in the Accord. See Accord, supra note 11. Although the Accord 
is viewed as having made an important contribution to the development of opinion practice, its specific 
recommendations have not generally been embraced. I discuss the development of the Accord in Part 
IV.A.2, infra. 
59. This section and the next apply a clause-by-clause analysis of the major portions of the standard 
form closing opinion, something Gilson did with respect to a standard-form asset purchase agreement in 
Value Creation, and something which has been encouraged by others. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The 
Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239, 253 (1995). 
60. TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, at 667. 
61. Theoretically, of course, the corporation could exist de facto or by estoppel, and so enter into 
the subject transactions without having de jure existence. See id. at 641. 
62. See id. There are other, more complex (and perhaps more difficult) opinions related to corporate 
existence that the recipient (e.g., the lender) could request. For example, the Company’s lawyer could be 
asked to opine that the Company was “duly incorporated” or “duly organized.” Id. at 641-42. How do 
these differ from the “valid existence” opinion? They would likely be viewed as referring to compliance 
with applicable corporate existence requirements in effect when the Company was formed, and/or at 
points leading up to the time the Company’s good standing certificate is obtained. This may be a much 
more complex and expensive determination to make. One lawyer tells a story about the pitfalls of this 
opinion: 
The story I tell on this is the very first opinion I did in my career was about a little hat 
company that was borrowing some money, and I had to do the due authorization opinion—this 
is 1974 or ’75—so I ask the client for the articles and bylaws and the minutes and all that and 
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The second substantive provision of the model due authority opinion builds 
on the existential conclusion of the first opinion, to assert that the Company has 
corporate (or other entity) power to execute, deliver, and perform under the 
operative agreements.64 These provisions are generally self-explanatory. If the 
Company lacks authority to engage in the transaction, then it is axiomatic that 
any other promises that might be made in the operative documents (including 
those that might duplicate or overlap with legal opinions) are void. 
Due authority opinions apparently have the deepest historical roots in third-
party closing opinion practice. A number of lawyers interviewed said they 
believed that third-party closing-opinion practice began in the late nineteenth 
century, as an outgrowth of municipal finance transactions, where 
governmental authority to borrow was frequently in question. There appears to 
be some support for this surmise. Robert Gordon has suggested that lawyers’ 
opinions were a response to protracted litigation over railroad bonds.65 Even 
though “the U.S. Supreme Court virtually always disallowed defenses against 
the validity of bonds,” he has observed, “investors [by the 1890s] did not wish 
to risk prolonged and expensive enforcement efforts, even if the law could help 
them force a favorable settlement.”66 Legal opinions—especially as to the 
authority of the municipality to incur the bonded indebtedness—were one 
response to the routine challenges to these bonds, which were often mounted by 
taxpayers (or elected officials) reluctant to make good on the obligations.67 
“When it became the standard practice of bond houses to obtain the opinion of 
a specially qualified attorney,” Charles Fairman has noted, “municipal bonding 
 
they send them over, and I’m looking at the articles diligently like a brand new lawyer, and 
discover that when the company was formed in 1920, the articles provided that the company 
would have a life of fifty years. The company had in fact expired. 
Interview with Attorney W-2, supra note 56, at 3. 
63. The absence of controversy may stem in part from the fact that the corporate existence opinion 
will usually be based on certificates issued by the secretary of state (or other government official) of the 
state in which the Company was formed. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. As to these matters, the 
lawyer will be an informational pass-through. 
64. “The Company (a) has the corporate power to execute, deliver, and perform the Credit 
Agreement and the Note, (b) has taken all corporate action necessary to authorize the execution, 
delivery, and performance of the Credit Agreement and the Note, and (c) has duly executed and 
delivered the Credit Agreement and the Note.” TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, at 668. 
65. Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 
1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 131 n.40 (Gerald L. 
Geison ed., 1983) (citing Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88, Part One, in 6 THE 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATES 918-
1116 (New York, 1971)). 
66. See Gordon, supra note 65, at 131 n.40 (emphasis in original). 
67. See id. at 79 (“One could not seriously think of marketing one’s bonds among Boston investors 
without an opinion on their validity from respected Boston bond counsel.”). Charles Fairman has 
observed that, during the period 1864 to 1888, “matters on municipal bonds bulked larger than any other 
category of the Court’s business.” Fairman, supra note 65, at 921 (‘“Probably no question in American 
jurisprudence has been more persistently and thoroughly litigated than the validity of municipal bonds in 
aid of railroads.’”) (quoting James A. Burhans, The Law of Municipal Bonds, at 2-3, 19-20 (S.A. Kean 
& Co., Bankers, Chicago & New York, 1889)). 
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underwent a profound change.”68 
Of course, a lawyer’s opinion that her client has authority to engage in the 
transaction is no guarantee that that will be the case. In the infamous 
Washington Public Power Supply System (“WPPSS”) cases,69 for example, 
some eighty-eight law firms were sued by the holders of $2.25 billion in bonds 
issued by WPPSS.70 The lawyers had issued opinions to their clients, who 
participated in the financing by entering into so-called “take-or-pay” contracts, 
which functioned essentially as a guarantee that WPPSS would sell a minimum 
amount of power to the participants, or would receive a minimum payment 
from them. The lawyers for the participants, who were for the most part 
municipalities, gave the standard opinions that each participant was authorized 
to enter into the agreement binding the participant to the project, and that the 
agreement “constituted a valid and binding agreement [of the participant] 
enforceable in accordance with its terms.”71 Unfortunately for the opining 
lawyers, the Washington Supreme Court later concluded that many of these 
participants did not, in fact, have authority to provide what were, in essence, 
financial guarantees.72 
Freed from their obligations under the take-or-pay contracts, the 
participants declined to do either, and the bonds went into default. The 
investors in these bonds sued the opining lawyers—unsuccessfully. A claim of 
aider and abettor secondary liability was alleged but given short shrift based on 
the absence of any allegations of “organization or relationship among the 
defendants permitting an expectation of concerted action.”73 Common law 
fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims were also dismissed due in 
essence to a lack of privity.74 
 
68. Fairman, supra note 65, at 922. Fairman quoted at length a banker’s brochure from 1890 which 
might explain the early role of counsel generally in this process: 
Many cases of repudiation of railroad-aid bonds (which . . . comprise by far the greater part of 
the defaults in the history of Municipal Bonds) have been brought about through the claim of 
illegality of issue. It is a matter of record that the proceedings bearing upon such issues were 
formerly loosely conducted, while purchasers were equally lax in giving the legal papers 
touching the same the attention and investigation which their importance demands, and which 
is invariably given them today . . . . Perfect equity between debtor and creditor demands . . . 
that the authority to issue shall be unquestionable, and bond-houses and other large fiduciary 
institutions of today meet this requirement by retaining attorneys of ability, who instead of 
taking for granted, as in former times, that everything had been “properly done, happened and 
performed,” now insist on all steps being taken in strict conformity with law. 
Id. at 922-23 (quoting Eben H. Gay, Municipal Bonds, at 39-40, 45 (N.W. Harris & Co., Bankers, 
Boston 1890)). 
69. Factual background concerning the WPPSS debacle is set forth in Chemical Bank v. 
Washington Public Power Supply System, 666 P.2d 329 (Wash. 1983), on appeal after remand, 691 P.2d 
524 (Wash. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065, 1075 (1985). 
70. Mirotznick v. Sensney, Davis & McCormick, 658 F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Wash. 1986). 
71. Id. at 936. 
72. Chem. Bank, 666 P.2d at 337-39. 
73. Mirotznick, 658 F. Supp. at 941. 
74. Id. at 943. 
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A lesson one might draw from the WPPSS cases is that courts have a fairly 
high tolerance for errors in due authority opinions.75 If so, one might infer that, 
to courts, the due authority opinion performs only a modest informational 
function—if the opinions really mattered, lawyers getting it wrong would be 
held liable. That, however, is not the way in which the lawyers interviewed for 
this project viewed them. Rather, lawyers overwhelmingly characterized this 
opinion as adding informational value. As one attorney explained: 
I think that maybe the value of [the] legal opinion is that it forces the attorney to go 
through the process of verifying power and authority . . . . [I]f you weren’t issuing a 
legal opinion, would you really sit down with the corporation’s minute book and 
make sure the directors have been properly elected and the officers properly elected 
and authorized by the board? I don’t know if you would do that, if you weren’t 
issuing an opinion.76 
It would seem that the due authority opinion frequently satisfies the value 
framework set forth above. In the case of a loan, it is critical to the reasonable 
expectations of the lender that the borrower has the authority to borrow (and 
repay) the loan, an essentially legal determination. As the same attorney noted, 
questions of authority are likely beyond the expertise of nonlawyer clients; they 
will not know whether they in fact have authority, and their representations 
alone cannot be dispositive.77 Finally, the lawyer that typically gives the 
opinion will be Company counsel and will be the least-cost producer of this 
information. Even if Company counsel was not the regular outside counsel, he 
or she will have developed a familiarity with the borrower that recipient’s 
counsel could not have developed.78 As one attorney explained: 
The theory, at least on the authorization . . . opinions, is that the seller or the 
borrower’s counsel or someone like that is in the best position to make sure [that] 
the bylaws were reviewed and [that] the Board met, all those sorts of things. You 
can get a warranty from the company, but that’s not worth anything if the company 
has financial problems. It just forces somebody to make sure that it’s been done 
right and in an authorization . . . opinion, it’s really not convenient for the other side 
to sort of dig into those sorts of things.79 
In short, there is support for the claim that producing this information 
through the closing opinion process responds to reasonable expectations by 
efficiently reducing an important, legal information asymmetry. 
 
75. As discussed in Part III.C.1, infra, courts would appear to be less tolerant of errors in the due 
authority opinion when it is accompanied by evidence of greater wrongdoing (e.g., “bad faith”) by the 
client. 
76. Interview with Attorney D-1 (May 13, 2004), transcript at 3. 
77. Id. (“When a party gives a representation and warranty that it has power and authority, they 
don’t know what that means.”). 
78. See, e.g., Interview with Attorney C-2 (May 11, 2004), transcript at 5-6 (“We don’t go through 
all the minute books and stuff like that [when representing lenders]. We just rely on the resolutions and 
the opinion . . . .”). 
79. Interview with Attorney W-2, supra note 56, transcript at 3. 
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2. No Violation/No Litigation 
A second standard set of opinions will assure the recipient that certain 
factual representations of the Company are accurate (or, in a classic legal-
double-negative, not inaccurate). Among other things, the lawyer may be asked 
to opine that the transaction will not violate or breach: (1) the Company’s 
organizational documents (the “no-violation (organization) opinion”);80 (2) 
laws that apply to the transaction (the “no-violation (applicable laws) 
opinion”);81 or (3) other agreements or undertakings of the Company (the “no-
violations (other obligations) opinion”).82 More controversially, the lawyer may 
also be asked to opine that the Company is not in violation of laws that 
generally apply to the Company (the “no-violation (other laws) opinion”),83 
and/or that it is not party to any pending or threatened litigation that would 
adversely affect the transaction or the Company itself (the “no litigation 
opinion”).84 
Using the framework set forth above, certain of these opinions would 
appear more likely to add value than others. The no-violation (other 
obligations) opinion would appear to be especially important, and not terribly 
controversial, as opinion recipients legitimately want to know that they are not 
unwittingly investing in a lawsuit.85 Moreover, although the existence of 
contracts, lawsuits, etc., is factual (and could thus be disclosed by the parties), 
legal expertise is required to assess the terms and materiality of these 
undertakings or litigations. And, as with the authority opinion, Company 
counsel—not recipient’s counsel—will be the least-cost producer of this 
information. 
Unlike counsel for the lender, for example, Company counsel can review 
this information without exposing the Company to a claim that it has breached 
confidentiality. Unlike the Company itself (or, more accurately, its officers and 
 
80. See, e.g., GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 16.2, at 490. 
81. Id. § 16.3, at 492. 
82. TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, app. A-2, at 670. The TriBar 1998 Report indicates that the 
no-violations (other obligations) opinion should be given by in-house, rather than outside, counsel. This 
has a certain intuitive appeal, as in-house lawyers will (or should) know more about these matters than 
would outside counsel. See Committee on Legal Opinions, ABA Section of Business Law, Closing 
Opinions of Inside Counsel, 58 BUS. LAW. 1127 (2003) (“In appropriate circumstances, delivery of an 
opinion of inside counsel may reduce cost and avoid delay by eliminating the need for outside counsel to 
familiarize itself with matters already known to inside counsel or to duplicate work performed by inside 
counsel in the course of employment.”). That said, if, as some lawyers indicate, the value of the opinion 
lies in the “independent” evaluation of the Company by an outsider, it is not clear how much one can 
rely on the opinion of in-house counsel. 
83. GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 16.5, at 512-13. 
84. Id. § 17.1, at 515. 
85. See Interview with Attorney K-3 (June 1, 2004), transcript at 3 (“[A] no-violation [opinion] is 
the most important opinion that a recipient gets because it does save on the due diligence. It means that 
the recipient of that opinion does not have to worry about whether or not there is a breach of the other 
party to some other agreement that they may or may not be aware of.”). 
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employees), Company counsel will likely have legal expertise that gives it an 
advantage in reviewing and interpreting these contracts and other undertakings. 
Being “independent” of the Company in some important sense, the opining 
lawyer will also have a degree of objectivity in assessing the real potential for 
conflict presented by the agreement, litigation, etc.86 And, in the event 
Company counsel determines that the proposed transaction will result in a 
violation, the lawyer is often in the best position to advise the Company about 
the steps that it should take to head the problem off, whether by disclosing the 
problem to the lender (with client permission, of course) or by modifying the 
other undertakings, and so forth. One lawyer summarized the value of the due 
authority and no-violations opinions as follows: 
I mean, if the company is really not a company, that’s not very good, because I 
don’t know what it means if I have contracted with a company that doesn’t really 
exist . . . . If there is litigation out there, I really would like to know. . . . I want to 
know if there are contracts, particularly material contracts, out there that are going 
to be violated. [R]epresentations and warranties don’t necessarily get us to the I-
really-want-to-know question. They do a good job of making sure that risk is 
allocated and how you’re going to deal with indemnities, but they don’t do quite 
such a good job of those things that you really, really think would be fundamentally 
a problem with respect to this [transaction].87 
But the further one’s opinion goes from the transaction at hand, the more 
problematic it would appear to be. Thus, lawyers noted that the cost-
effectiveness of the no-violations (other laws) opinion depends on its scope. 
This variant on the no-violations opinion asks the lawyer for the Company to 
state that the Company is in compliance with all (or all important) laws 
affecting the Company. One lawyer observed that in its broad form, this 
opinion was unrealistic and not terribly valuable. This opinion asks the lawyer 
to say that the client: 
has never violated any health law or something. Well, how are you going to give 
that? When you’re talking about some manufacturer, some restaurant around the 
country, you [can’t say] they’ve never been out of compliance . . . with any health 
code and have all permits, let’s say food.88 
Problems with no-violations opinions may stem at least in part from the 
factual nature of the opinion. Unlike the due authority opinion, which is often 
 
86. One in-house attorney suggested that in-house counsel may, under the right circumstances, be 
in the best position of all to provide a no-violations opinion about the “client” (i.e., the lawyer’s 
employer). Although this is an opinion that “really requires you to be on your toes,” this attorney also 
observed that it “is actually one opinion that in-house counsel [is] better situated to give [because] I have 
to run around and make sure that I am still comfortable that the insurance is signed and lines up with 
what I know our material agreements are.” Interview with Attorney M-2 (Aug. 25, 2005), transcript at 7. 
87. See Interview with Attorney S-1 (May 7, 2004), transcript at 4. 
88. Interview with Attorney V-1 (May 25, 2005), transcript at 13. As noted above, the ABA 2002 
Guidelines indicate that such an opinion would be inappropriate. ABA 2002 Guidelines, supra note 11, § 
4.3, at 880 (“[A]n opinion giver should not be asked for an opinion that its client is not in violation of 
any applicable laws or regulations or that its client is not in default under any of the client’s contractual 
obligations.”). 
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based on the attorney’s first-hand knowledge of corporate governance actions 
leading to the transaction, the no-violations opinion might require the lawyer to 
investigate other transactions, other laws, or general states of affairs with which 
she has no direct experience. Moreover, there can be legitimate disagreement 
over the extent to which these opinions respond to the reasonable expectations 
of the parties. These opinions would appear to be frequent sources of friction 
between lawyers. 
A special subcategory here is the no-litigation opinion, which in many 
respects is not a legal opinion at all.89 Rather, as Glazer observes, “[w]hether or 
not a company has been sued or threatened with a lawsuit is a factual, not a 
legal, matter.”90 To the extent these opinions relate to the transaction itself, they 
would certainly appear to add value. For example, one attorney told the story of 
a transaction in which counsel to the borrower provided a “clean” no-litigation 
opinion (stating, in substance, that there was no litigation threatened or pending 
against the borrower).91 At closing, borrower’s counsel informed the attorney 
that there had been a written claim threatening to commence an action for 
injunctive relief that would seriously jeopardize the financing. 
When lender’s counsel stated that the threatened suit had to be noted in the 
opinion, counsel for the borrower objected. “‘We really don’t want to put that 
in the opinion,’ the borrower’s counsel said. ‘[W]e’ve told you about it, isn’t 
that enough?’ The lender’s counsel said, ‘[W]ell . . . I know about it, [and] I’ve 
got to tell my client about it.’” But because this attorney’s client was the agent 
for a number of lenders, and was also under an obligation to tell these lenders 
of the threatened suit, borrower’s counsel had to “put it in the opinion.” When 
asked if he thought this important piece of information would otherwise have 
come out in the course of diligence, this attorney simply said, “I don’t know. I 
don’t think so.”92 
As the no-litigation opinion broadens—to cover the Company’s litigation 
status generally, for example—questions arise as to whether the opinion itself 
adds value, especially where the opining attorney has no particular reason to 
know much about the litigation.93 Nevertheless, even if litigation has no 
relationship to the transaction at hand, courts are not especially tolerant of 
errors in these opinions, especially when the lawyer (or firm) that rendered the 
opinion knew (or had reason to know) of the litigation. In National Bank of 
Canada v. Hale & Dorr, for example, the Massachusetts Superior Court denied 
 
89. GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 17.1, at 516 (the no-litigation opinion “calls for little, if 
any, legal analysis”). 
90. Id. § 17.1, at 516-17. 
91. Interview with Attorney C-1, supra note 58, at 14-15. 
92. Id. at 15. 
93. See GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 17.1, at 517 (General no-litigation opinions are “not 
appropriate when the opinion giver is only one of many firms retained by the company.”). 
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the defendant law firm’s summary judgment motion on plaintiff’s 
misrepresentation claim.94 Here, the firm had issued an opinion stating, among 
other things, that there was no litigation against its client that “could have a 
material adverse effect on the business” of the client, except as specified on a 
schedule attached to the loan agreement entered into with the plaintiffs, a group 
of banks.95 It turned out that potentially significant litigation against the 
borrower was not disclosed, but for unrelated reasons the borrower became 
insolvent. 
Nevertheless, the banks sued the firm for “misrepresentation,” a cause of 
action which required the banks to show “a false statement of a material fact 
made to induce the plaintiff to act, together with reliance on the false statement 
by the plaintiff.”96 The Massachusetts Superior Court denied the firm’s motion 
for summary judgment because, among other reasons, the firm “represented to 
the Banks that ‘it possesse[d] superior knowledge concerning the subject matter 
to which the misrepresentations relate[d]’ and that it made its statements with 
certainty.”97 It is not surprising that this troubled the court, since the firm was 
also counsel to the borrower in that litigation.98 
One way to test the informational value of closing opinions—and especially 
the no-violations/no-litigation opinions—is to determine whether their 
disclosures have altered or ended transactions. Most of the lawyers interviewed 
for this project indicated that they had seen transactions change or even fall 
apart due to information produced in the process of negotiation and opinion 
drafting, and this was especially true of the no-violations opinion. Yet, while 
flushing out material information appears to be an important function of the due 
authority and no-violations opinions, it is not always clear that the information 
will be considered (at least directly) by the recipient-client. “God forbid if one 
of my bank clients ever reads the damn opinion,” one attorney explained.99 
 
94. See Nat’l Bank of Canada v. Hale & Dorr, No. 2000000296, 2004 WL 1049072, at *4-7 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2004). 
95. Id. at *2. 
96. Id. at *4 (quoting Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 72, 77 (1991)). 
97. Id. at *10 (citing Stolzoff v. Waste Sys. Int’l, Inc., 58 Mass. App. Ct. 747, 760 (2003)). An 
irony here is, as discussed above, that the firm had attempted to limit its liability by disclaiming or 
limiting the knowledge its opinion purported to represent. 
98. A similar result obtained under similar circumstances in the unreported decision in Dean Foods 
Co. v. Pappathanasi, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 598 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2004), Memorandum and Order on Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment, Civ. Act. No. 01-2595 (BLS) (Mar. 8 2004), where deal counsel 
provided a no-litigation opinion even though it was also defending related entities in criminal 
investigations. See also ABA Section of Business Law Committee on Legal Opinions, Legal Opinion 
Newsletter 4, at 2-3 (June 2005) (reprinting and discussing Dean Foods decision). 
99. Interview with Attorney C-1, supra note 58, at 8. Not all lawyers had this experience. One 
attorney indicated that she discusses closing opinions with her clients (who are often money-center banks) 
“on every deal because it is from the closing checklist.” Interview with Attorney S-2 (July 26, 2005), 
transcript at 19. In one transaction in which a lawyer on the other side was being difficult in the opinion 
process, this attorney observed that she “was surprised at the extent to which all the business people on 
the deal understand that something unreasonable was being asked for in the opinion context.” Id. 
LIPSON_PRINTED 5/10/2006  1:18:25 PM 
Berkeley Business Law Journal Vol. 3.1, 2005 
80 
Nor is the Company (that is, the party that is the subject of the opinion) 
likely to learn much from the closing opinion process. Rather, opinion-giving 
lawyers say that their own clients (that is, the Company that is the subject of the 
opinion) often view the opinion process as a burden, a part of the “checklist” 
engineered by the lender (or other party in a position to demand the opinion as 
a closing condition).100 “I do not think they give a good gosh darn about 
[closing opinions],” one former general counsel observed.101 “All that mattered 
to [the CEO of her company] was that he wanted that new financing because 
we were getting a better rate.”102 Another lawyer put it succinctly: “Clients 
have no patience with . . . discussions [about closing opinions].”103 
This does not, of course, mean that the information has no relevance to the 
client. Rather, it would appear that clients—whether recipients or subjects—
rely, wittingly or not, on their attorneys to know that the opinion has produced 
the appropriate information in the appropriate ways. Clients may not read the 
opinions, but they may well care that their lawyers do.104 
Clients may care little about the content because one view of the closing 
opinion is that it is a mechanism to discipline or structure the lawyers, the 
parties, and indeed, the transaction itself. According to one New York lawyer 
who frequently represents lenders, “without a legal opinion, it would be easy 
for people not to focus on [the details of a transaction], not out of malice or 
 
100. See Interview with Attorney C-2, supra note 78, at 3. 
101. Interview with Attorney W-4 (May 24, 2005), transcript at 8. 
102. Id. (“I think . . . the way a lot of business people look upon it [is] you are such a pain in the 
ass.”). Another attorney put it more colorfully, indicating that in his experience clients do not “giv[e] a 
shit about opinions really. All they wanted to do is get the transaction done.” Interview with Attorney K-
1 (June 10, 2005), transcript at 17. 
103. Interview with Attorney G-1 (June 3, 2004), transcript at 26. As another attorney explained: 
[F]rom time to time, of course, [you] get into a dispute between the lawyers over what the 
opinion should say and shouldn’t say. And you can’t really appeal to the clients to resolve it, 
because they don’t care. As far as they’re concerned, that’s something for the lawyers to fuss 
about and if you tell your own client, you know, “There is a big problem in this opinion, it’s 
going to hold up the deal. . . [t]hey don’t say, “Okay, I’ll talk to the other side.” They just say, 
“Well, that’s unacceptable. You just have to resolve it so we can move on.” 
Interview with Attorney K-1, supra note 102, transcript at 4-5. 
 The Report of the Washington State Bar Association aptly describes this phenomenon: 
Even quite sophisticated clients often view opinions as so much legal boilerplate and have no 
sympathy for lawyers locked in dispute over arcane issues, particularly in the last hours before 
an important closing. And all too often, the client has a point: the lawyers have either created a 
problem by leaving resolution of an issue to the last minute, or have let ego, inflexibility or an 
“unbusinesslike” degree of concern over personal liability take the place of judgment and 
thoughtfulness. 
Washington State Report, supra note 6, at 7. 
104. It may also depend on who the client is. A lawyer who frequently represents large institutional 
lenders indicated that she discusses closing opinions with clients “on every deal because it is from the 
closing checklist, it is something they know about.” See Interview with Attorney S-2, supra note 99, at 
19. “Even if they don’t actually read the full opinion or understand it,” she said, “I actually think in the 
lending markets a legal opinion is important . . . the lenders do want to see that the thought process has 
been undertaken and concluded.” Id. at 10. 
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laziness, but just because there is so much going on.”105 The closing opinion 
“imposes discipline,” she said, because it is evidence that “somebody ha[d] to 
think through the issues and check in their own mind and . . . go through the 
steps . . . .”106 As another attorney (in-house counsel to a large public company) 
puts it, closing opinions help to assure that lawyers (and perhaps their clients) 
“do not outrun [their] headlights.”107 
B. Signaling Remote Parties (the “Market”) 
The disciplining explanation of closing opinions overlaps with another 
economically oriented theory, namely that the closing opinion is a signal to the 
market in general of the quality of the deal. Closing opinions, on this view, act 
as a sort of “good housekeeping seal of approval” not just for the parties to the 
transaction, but also for third parties who take a direct or indirect interest in the 
transaction. 
Closing opinions have long interacted with broader markets in complex and 
subtle ways. As discussed above, there is a view that third-party closing 
opinion practice began with the advent of the municipal bond market in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century.108 Certainly the securities laws enacted 
during the Depression—the 1933 and 1934 Acts, in particular—appear to have 
linked the requirement of an opinion to access to the public capital markets.109 
Often, when lawyers get into trouble for having given a closing opinion, it is 
because they are accused of a securities-related offense.110 
Lawyers appear keenly aware of the market-signaling function of closing 
opinions. “[S]ince most loans are syndicated,” one attorney explained, the 
existence and scope of opinions will in part be “a question of what kind of 
 
105. Id. at 9. This lawyer told the following story in support of her view that closing opinions 
perform a disciplining function: 
 I actually worked on a deal recently where we were refinancing an old deal, and they had 
added collateral later in the deal and so there was an amendment to allow for that additional 
collateral. There was a list of items that needed to be satisfied before the amendment would 
become effective, and a borrower satisfied that test and took on additional collateral, but 
because one of the items did not include a legal opinion, no legal opinion was given, and 
nobody made sure that the borrower had perfected [an interest] in that additional property that 
it acquired. So, then all the banks thought that we were going to allow them to make this 
acquisition and that [the interest in] those assets acquired in connection to that acquisition 
would be perfected. . . . Everything was done that the lawyers felt had to be done, and then by 
that time the acquisition was consummated, nobody thought about the last point because there 
was probably a first or second year lawyer just checking the box . . . . 
Id. 
106. Id. at 9, 25. 
107. Interview with Attorney M-2, supra note 86, at 5. 
108. See discussion supra note 68. 
109. As noted above, legal opinions are important in establishing certain defenses under the 
Securities Act of 1933. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
110. See, e.g., SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., Civil Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 3, 
1972). This case is discussed in greater detail beginning at note 124, infra. 
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expectation is in the marketplace.”111 Another attorney explained as follows: 
[T]he opinion is not only for the counter-party to a particular document, but for a 
third-party who may not even be a party to that agreement . . . . There are many 
types of project finance and securitization type transactions where a third-party is 
actually making a credit decision based on the assumption of enforceability of a 
contract that is a very crucial element of that financing, whether it’s a project 
finance—you may have a power purchase contract where the obligor agrees to buy 
the power—the lender who is lending to the seller of the power is relying on that 
buyer’s obligation to buy, yet it’s not a party to that power purchase agreement. But 
it sure wants to be sure that . . . that power purchase contract is enforceable.112 
In other words, some of the value of the opinion letter may derive not from 
its informational effects on the initial recipient, but rather on the more limited 
signal its mere existence may provide to later market participants. If third-party 
closing opinions perform this sort of signaling function, it would further 
support Gilson’s theory about the reputational bonding that occurs when 
lawyers assist clients in business transactions. The verification benefits would 
inure not simply to the immediate parties to the transaction, but to those later in 
the chain who might succeed to the position of, for example, the initial lender. 
To the extent that access to wider markets has value, third-party closing 
opinions may add value by increasing this access. 
The signaling view of closing opinion practice would find theoretical 
support in the observation that laws (and perhaps legal opinions, themselves) 
are “products,” commodities that, when properly sourced and used, promote 
efficient market exchange.113 Professor Romano, for example, has argued that 
Delaware came to dominate the market for corporate charters because its 
default rules developed a centripetal force that made it cheaper and more 
valuable for lawyers—and not just clients—to use.114 Delaware law became a 
“product,” Romano reasoned, because incorporating in Delaware gave clients 
(and lawyers) immediate access to “Delaware’s well-developed case law, 
which provides a pool of handy precedents.”115 One virtue of this body of 
precedent was, according to Romano, the ability to “obtain[] almost 
instantaneously a legal opinion on any issue of Delaware law.”116 Professor 
 
111. Interview with Attorney B-1 (May 7, 2004), transcript at 4. 
112. Interview with Attorney K-3, supra note 85, at 7-8. 
113. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985). 
114. Id. at 274-75. Chartering in Delaware became advantageous not only to clients, but also to 
lawyers, because the “reduc[ed] cost of specialization . . . decrease[s] the cost of furnishing legal advice 
to corporate clients.” Id. It is more efficient for lawyers to have their clients incorporate in Delaware 
because “when all their transactions can be governed by one state code,” they can “expand their services 
to include clients in several states without having to keep up with the intricacies of different codes and 
case law.” Id. at 275. 
115. Id. at 274. 
116. See id. This is likely correct with respect to corporate governance (i.e., due authority) opinions 
for corporations organized under Delaware law. There is consensus that competent business lawyers in 
any U.S. jurisdiction can provide such opinions. As noted in Part III.A, infra, however, there is growing 
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Klausner has expanded this analysis, to observe that the market for contract 
terms—including those implicated by chartering in Delaware—presents a 
network effect.117 This network effect—created in part by standardized forms 
of closing opinions—promotes increasingly efficient market signaling.118 
The signaling explanation has its limits, however. First, there is the 
question of to whom the opinion is addressed, and whether others (not the 
addressees) may be permitted to rely on the opinion. The typical third-party 
closing opinion will be addressed to the party seeking the opinion (e.g., the 
lender in a loan) and their successors or permitted assignees.119 Yet, lawyers are 
typically careful to circumscribe the universe of those who may “rely” on the 
opinion.120 For example, lawyers would appear inclined to restrict reliance by 
non-addressees or by addressees outside the context of the given transaction.121 
In a similar vein, lawyers may be inclined to restrict the assignability of their 
opinions in general.122 In theory, this means that only the addressee or 
permitted assignees can sue on the opinion if it is in error, an attempt to capture 
the privity defense that was historically available to lawyers sued for errors in 
their opinions.123 Yet the limits on reliance or assignability do not, apparently, 
prevent the recipient from disclosing the existence of the opinion to later third 
parties. While the inability to sue on the opinion may affect its value, it would 
 
concern about the ability of non-Delaware lawyers to issue governance opinions as to unincorporated 
entities, such as limited liability companies, whose affairs may be governed by an operating agreement 
that involves issues of Delaware contract (or property or tort or agency) law. Non-Delaware lawyers 
may not be sufficiently familiar with these other aspects of Delaware law to provide an opinion on these 
matters. See infra Part III.A. To the extent that Delaware law is only valuable to (because practiced only 
by) Delaware lawyers, one may expect to see non-Delaware lawyers balk. See TriBar Remedies Report, 
supra note 6, at 1487 n.25. 
117. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757, 764-65 (1995). 
118. See id. at 767 (“Because they have incentives to obtain the highest value for their firm’s 
shares, managers attempt to offer terms that maximize share values by minimizing agency costs and 
signaling to investors valuable information about the firm. Those terms might define shareholder voting 
rights, managers’ duties of care and loyalty, shareholders’ rights to dividends, or other aspects of the 
relationships among shareholders and managers.”). 
119. See GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 2.3.1, at 40-41. 
120. The TriBar form, for example, provides that “This opinion letter is being delivered to you in 
connection with the above described transaction and may not be relied on by you for any other purpose. 
This opinion letter may not be relied on by or furnished to any other Person without our prior consent.” 
TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, at 668. 
121. GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 2.3.2, at 43-44. 
122. In a recent survey conducted by the ABA Section of Business Law Committee on Legal 
Opinions, forty-seven of the forty-eight responding attorneys indicated that they include a limitation on 
the assignability of third-party closing opinions. See Opinion Practices, supra note 9. 
123. See, e.g., Savs. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); United Bank of Kuwait v. Eventure 
Energy Enhanced Oil Recovery Assoc., 763 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1992) (reasoning that “before 
a party may recover in tort for pecuniary loss sustained as a result of another’s negligent 
misrepresentations there must be a showing that there was either actual privity of contract between the 
parties or a relationship so close as to approach that of privity”). The privity rules are discussed further 
below. 
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appear unlikely to negate its signaling function. 
More troubling is the fact that closing opinions can sometimes send the 
wrong signals. In the infamous National Student Marketing Corp. case, for 
example, closing opinions were alleged to have aided and abetted securities 
fraud.124 There, the prestigious firm of White & Case (among others) was sued 
by (among others) the Securities and Exchange Commission, for a variety of 
alleged transgressions in connection with its client’s fraud.125 Although errors 
in third-party closing opinions were only one part of the problem, the case 
nevertheless set off the first of many rounds of public deliberation about the 
nature and role of opinion practice.126 
And then there is Enron. According to the Final Report of Neal Batson, the 
Court-Appointed Examiner of Enron, Vinson & Elkins (V&E), and Andrews & 
Kurth (A&K), Enron’s principal outside firms, delivered dozens of closing 
opinions on the “true sale” of assets or the “true issuance” of securities in 
complex and questionable transactions.127 According to the Examiner, in 
certain cases these opinions may have been inappropriate.128 These firms issued 
these opinions despite the fact that they were “concerned about several terms in 
 
124. SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., Civil Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972). 
125. In SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., the SEC alleged that the directors and officers of 
National Student Marketing Corporation (NSMC) and their lawyers had violated the anti-fraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws by concealing the true financial condition of NSMC and its 
counterpart in a merger. 457 F. Supp. 682, 686-87 (D.D.C. 1978). The financial problems stemmed in 
part from sham transactions into which NSMC had entered several months earlier. See 402 F. Supp. 641 
(D.D.C. 1975). The financial problems were discovered shortly before closing of the merger, which 
meant that the proxy statements used to solicit the target’s shareholders’ approval of the merger had 
been materially misleading. 457 F. Supp. at 689, 695. Because the lawyers (including White & Case) 
permitted the merger to go forward, without disclosing to the buyers the material changes in NSMC's 
financial statements, they were found to have aided and abetted violations of § 10(b) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act and § 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act. Id. at 712. Although not the sole basis 
of the claims, the White & Case attorneys allegedly contributed to the fraud by issuing opinion letters at 
the closing of the merger. Id. at 712-13. The firm settled prior to trial. The White & Case partner 
involved agreed to suspend his practice for 180 days. SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,027 (1977). 
 The White & Case opinion was apparently based in part on an opinion issued by counsel for the 
alleged purchaser in the sham transactions that preceded the merger. 402 F. Supp. at 645-46. These 
opinions claimed that certain money-losing assets of NSMC had been transferred to the purchasers prior 
to the end of NSMC’s fiscal year. Id. at 645. The court in earlier proceedings held that the lawyer who 
issued these opinions “knowingly aided and abetted a violation of the federal securities laws” by issuing 
these opinions. See id. at 646. The case was later the subject of a novel. See ARTHUR R.G. SOLMSSEN, 
THE COMFORT LETTER (1975); see also Richard W. Painter, Irrationality and Cognitive Bias at a 
Closing in Arthur Solmssen’s The Comfort Letter, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1111, 1128 (2000) (discussing 
the NSMC case and its novelization). Today, while lawyers may well have concerns about liability, 
cases such as Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), 
significantly limit lawyers’ aiding and abetting liability under U.S. securities laws. 
126. Within a year of the NSMC scandal, two major doctrinal articles on closing opinions 
appeared. See John P. Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.J. 371; James J. 
Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions—An Attempt to Bring Some Order out of Some Chaos, 
28 BUS. LAW. 915 (1973) [hereinafter Fuld, Chaos]. As discussed in Part IV, infra, this scandal also 
spurred the bar associations to become involved in this practice. 
127. Enron Final Report, supra note 15, at 50. 
128. Id. at 49-50. 
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these transactions that created questions about whether a sale had occurred.”129 
Based on these concerns, the Examiner concluded that a fact-finder could 
determine that the law firms committed malpractice under Texas law, and aided 
and abetted breaches of fiduciary duties by Enron officers.130 
Strictly speaking, these were often not “third-party” closing opinions. 
Rather, they were addressed to Enron itself or affiliates engaged in these 
transactions. To this extent, one might then argue that no erroneous signaling 
could have occurred, even if the opinions were improper. Not being issued to 
third parties, no one other than Enron could have or should have relied on the 
opinions, and so no misleading signal could have been sent, at least by the 
opinions themselves. But this would ignore the larger context in which these 
opinions were given. According to the Examiner, even if “third parties” did not 
rely on these opinions, it would appear that Enron’s accountants (Arthur 
Andersen) did when certifying erroneous financial information.131 Without 
these opinions, Andersen may not have been able to accord the subject 
transactions the accounting treatment Enron wanted—accounting treatment 
that, in the final analysis, may have misled investors.132 
It would appear that, whatever else may be true of Enron, closing opinions 
issued in certain of its transactions failed to perform their informational 
functions. They may have formed links in informational chains. But, at a 
minimum, the inferences drawn from this information appear to have been 
wrong. 
Whether Enron’s lawyers should be culpable for these errors has not yet 
been determined.133 The problem, as one lawyer noted, may be that “Enron was 
represented by firms like Vinson & Elkins and Andrews & Kurth, which are 
 
129. Id. at 50. 
130. Id. at 48-49. 
131. Compare Enron Final Report, supra note 15, at 48 (V&E’s work “included rendering legal 
opinions . . . [which] were required by [auditor Arthur] Andersen to allow Enron to obtain the 
accounting treatment that it sought for these transactions.”), with Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 30 (Enron’s 
“information failure . . . is not the result of inaccurate information provided by the lawyers”). See also 
Nathan Koppel, Wearing Blinders, 26 AM. LAW. 75, 164 (July 2004) (discussing informational effects 
of V&E opinions); Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1242-43 (2003) (discussing use of structured finance opinions). 
132. In fact, according to the Examiner’s Report, V&E engaged in a considerable amount of hand 
wringing about whether it could or should issue many of these opinions. “Vinson & Elkins attorneys 
testified that they repeatedly told both Enron and Andersen, that Andersen had asked for the wrong 
opinion when it requested a true issuance opinion. This was potentially significant because Vinson & 
Elkins did not believe that it could provide a true sale opinion in some of those transactions as 
structured.” Enron Final Report, supra note 15, at 31. For interesting speculation on what Enron’s 
lawyers might have thought and done in the face of pressure to give these opinions, see Milton C. 
Regan, Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139 (2005). 
133. Professor Schwarcz would appear to blame investors for drawing these erroneous conclusions, 
not those who produced the information. See Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 7 n.33 (“I argue . . . that these 
[information] failures are primarily the fault of investors, and at most they are exacerbated by the dual-
information problem—that legal-opinion information is accurately provided for one purpose, 
bankruptcy, but then used out of context for another purpose, accounting.”). 
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very highly regarded firms, but [that] didn’t make Enron honest . . . . [T]he fact 
that you have a reputable lawyer representing the client is no evidence of the 
client’s honesty.”134 Thus, there are limits to the extent to which a lawyer can, 
through opinion practice, act as an effective reputational intermediary. The 
market signal of an opinion—indeed, the signal generally sent by the presence 
of prestigious counsel—can be misused. 
Over-reliance on the verification function of business lawyering, especially 
as indicated by closing opinions, has been the basis of some criticism of 
Gilson’s model. In one of the few empirical studies that has touched on closing 
opinion practice, sociologists Mark Suchman and Mia Cahill, who studied 
lawyers in Silicon Valley, have argued, contra Gilson, that closing opinions 
have little informational value.135 In their view, opinion letters “merely restate 
the client’s pre-negotiated representations and warranties.”136 Because closing 
opinions (at least in Silicon Valley transactions) are “informationally 
superfluous,” Suchman and Cahill argue that opinion letters exist to help the 
parties manage the uncertainty inherent in the high-risk world of venture 
investing.137 They come to this conclusion based on the assumption that “a law 
firm is legally responsible for the veracity of its opinion letters.”138 Lawyers 
thus issue opinions, according to Suchman and Cahill, not because opinions 
produce or verify information, but because lawyers are, in certain contexts, co-
venturers with their entrepreneurial clients. 
It is not clear how broadly one can construe this criticism. First, as observed 
above, even the most basic opinion letters do go beyond a client’s 
representations. If, for example, the opinion letter states that the Company has 
authority to engage in the transaction, it is conveying something different than 
that same statement appearing solely in the operative documents. Coming from 
the lawyer, it has an authority (so to speak) that it would lack in the underlying 
contracts. One person’s repetition is another person’s verification. 
Second, even if their observations were accurate, they applied to a limited 
context—that of high-tech, venture-capital-financed investing. As one attorney 
explained, “in the wild venture capital days . . . a lot of . . . people hired big law 
 
134. Interview with Attorney B-1, supra note 111, at 4. Although a conclusion about the role that 
closing-opinions played in Enron will have to wait for another day, they may provide one part of the 
answer to Professor Langevoort’s question about Enron: “How was the market for such a widely 
followed stock so easily fooled, especially when (in hindsight, at least) warning signs about obscure 
accounting, risk-shifting, and self-dealing practices were visible?” Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the 
Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 135 (2002). 
135. Suchman & Cahill, supra note 5, at 694-95. 
136. Id. at 695. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. (“[E]ven a simple reiteration of the client’s representations would place the law firm’s 
resources on the line as a kind of insurance against deception.”). 
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firms for the credibility that the law firm brought to the table.”139 Given the 
volatile nature of venture investing, “[t]he problem for the lawyers was these 
people could be gone tomorrow. But your opinion would still be here.”140 In 
other words, the function that Suchman and Cahill identify may be less 
plausible in less volatile areas of practice (e.g., lending, asset sales, etc.). 
Third, even if the words within the four corners of the opinion letter are not 
news to the recipient—and in certain respects they could not be (if only 
because, as some lawyers observe, the recipient may not read it)—the process 
of producing the opinion also generates information that is important to the 
transaction, which may not otherwise be forthcoming, and upon which the 
recipient and the “market” may rely. Among other things, the opinion process 
may cause a lawyer with concerns to decline to offer a standard opinion. The 
most important opinion information may, therefore, come not from the opinion 
itself, but from the lacunae—the omitted standard term, which signals that there 
may be some problem precluding the opinion. This would lead the recipient to 
seek more information, which, as discussed above, might result in changes to 
(or termination of) the transaction. In short, opinion writing would appear to be 
about more than co-venturing with clients. Closing opinions are also 
independent assertions about the legal and factual context in which the 
transaction is being conducted. 
III. PRICE PROBLEMS 
While certain features of closing opinions may produce and verify valuable 
information under certain circumstances, the practice is not an unalloyed model 
of market efficiency. Closing opinions are not cheap under the best of 
circumstances. Several lawyers indicated that as a general matter, a third-party 
legal opinion would add at least $5,000 to the transaction and, depending on the 
type of transaction, substantially more.141 This is not necessarily a cost clients 
are happy to pay. As one lawyer explained, “[o]pinion practice is a fairly 
academic part of the practice[,] and clients view it as a transaction cost—
something that they never want to have to hire a lawyer for, in my 
experience.”142 
 
139. Interview with Attorney M-2, supra note 86, at 18. 
140. Id. 
141. See, e.g., Interview with Attorney W-2, supra note 56, at 14 (“[Y]ou can’t get an opinion out 
the door, even the simplest authorization opinion, for under $5,000 . . . .”). 
142. Interview with Attorney L-1 (May 6, 2004), transcript at 4. Of course, this may flow from 
business clients’ general disdain for the formalities of business law practice. See Interview with 
Attorney G-2 (May 10, 2004), transcript at 3 (“[A] lot of business people think that all of the corporate 
formalities are just foolishness and a waste of time.”). Nevertheless, attorneys often cite stories about 
needless expense and delay caused by opinion-writing. “[I]n one case,” a lawyer said, 
I was representing the borrower on a transaction and in this case, [a] Boston instead of New 
York lender, insisted on land use opinions for half a dozen projects—they were buying a 
manufacturing facility . . . that had a number of locations in very small towns, and I fought 
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Lawyers interviewed for this project indicated three recurrent types of 
economic problems with closing opinion practice. First, there is the 
enforceability opinion, which lawyers frequently claim costs more than it is 
worth. Second, there are procedural and substantive limitations on opinion 
practice which call into question the informational value of the typical closing 
opinion. Third, and perhaps most controversially, there is the problem of 
lawyer liability, the externalization of the risk of deal failure onto lawyers. 
A. Enforceability Opinions 
Unlike the due authority and no-violations opinions discussed above, 
lawyers indicate that the enforceability opinion—the “dumbest of all . . . 
opinions,” according to one lawyer143—may systematically fail to reduce 
information asymmetries in a cost-effective way. 
It sounds innocuous enough. The TriBar model provides that the lawyer 
will say that the operative documents are “valid and binding obligations of the 
Company enforceable against the Company in accordance with their terms.”144 
Sometimes called the “remedies” opinion, this opinion “addresses the 
enforceability of each of the undertakings of [the Company],” including the 
affirmative and negative covenants in the operative documents, as well as the 
remedies specified therein.145 
At least as articulated by the practitioner’s literature, the principal problem 
with the remedies opinion is economic in nature. A recent report of the 
Business Law Section of the California Bar Association, for example, observes 
that “[o]ften, lawyers and their clients request a remedies opinion from counsel 
for another party in the transaction without engaging in the recommended 
cost/benefit analysis.”146 While the literature is not terribly clear on what 
should factor into this calculation, the fact that “the market” demands the 
enforceability opinion is not, of itself, said to be sufficient.147 
 
tooth and nail with the Boston firm saying this is a huge waste of money—it’s a very difficult 
opinion to give that you’re not going to get any benefit from but it’s going to cost my client a 
lot of time and money. We lost that, and the client said, “Go ahead and do it.” But as the 
example I gave, I said, “This isn’t like the Empire State Building or the Hancock Tower . . . . 
You’re in towns where these mills have been . . . for 120 years, and in one case, they do have a 
zoning ordinance, and nobody can find a copy of it, so the value of the legal opinion is kind of 
the tail wagging the dog here.” 
Id. at 6. 
143. Interview with Attorney G-1, supra note 103, at 5, 20. Another attorney observed that the 
enforceability opinion “clearly was not something that people had carefully thought through.” See 
Interview with Attorney R-1 (May 12, 2004), transcript at 3. Even though “the wisdom of it is 
occasionally challenged, most people end up” giving the opinion because “at least in the U.S., you 
cannot swim upstream.” Id. 
144. TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, § 3.1. 
145. TriBar Remedies Report, supra note 6, at 1484. 
146. California 2004 Report, supra note 1, app. 4, at 1 (footnote omitted). 
147. See id; see also ABA 2002 Guidelines, supra note 11, ¶ 1.6 (“An assertion that a specific 
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Lawyers suggest that the enforceability opinion may cost more than it is 
worth for either or both of two reasons. First, upon reflection, it is not entirely 
clear what the opinion means. Does it mean that the opining lawyer believes 
that “each and every” provision of the operative agreements would be 
enforceable? Or only that certain “essential” provisions would be?148 If the 
former, how seriously should we take the opinion? Is the lawyer opining on the 
accuracy of the client’s factual representations and warranties? If the latter, 
what is considered “essential,” and who decides? Lawyers observed that 
significant disputes arise over what the enforceability opinion means, and how 
broadly it should be construed.149 “Many of our fights,” one attorney observed, 
“are over the issue of enforceability, and it’s kind of silly.”150 These fights 
likely increase costs, but may not correspondingly improve the information in 
the deal. 
Second, even greater efficiency problems crop up because of the division of 
labor. As with the other closing opinions, the enforceability opinion is often 
written by the lawyer (for example, for the borrower) who did not draft the 
underlying documents. While this lawyer may be in the best position to offer 
the authority and no-violations opinion—where she is offering information 
about her client—the enforceability opinion asks the lawyer to opine on 
something with which she may have comparatively little familiarity—
documents written by opposing counsel.151 As one lawyer who typically 
represented lenders explained: 
When it comes to enforceability, in most cases, you [e.g., the bank’s lawyer] drafted 
the document, so you’re asking me to tell you that a document which probably you 
have drafted, used in various variations a hundred times in the past, you’re asking 
 
opinion is ‘market’—i.e., that lawyers are rendering it in other transactions—does not make it 
appropriate to request or render such an opinion if it is inconsistent with these Guidelines.”). 
148. Compare TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, § 3.3.4, nn. 75, 77 & 78, § 3.5.1, with Accord, 
supra note 11, § 10(a), and California 1992 Report, supra note 58, at 5-8. 
149. See, e.g., Interview with Attorney S-2, supra note 99, at 19-20. As discussed in note 116, 
supra, a current—and perhaps expanding—subcategory of remedies opinion disputes involves the extent 
to which non-Delaware lawyers can give enforceability opinions on transactions governed by Delaware 
law. There appears to be little quibble with the proposition that any competent business lawyer is 
qualified to give standard corporate governance (due authority) opinions for a Delaware corporation. 
This is presumably because Delaware corporate law is sufficiently well-known that admission to that 
state’s bar is not needed to develop the requisite level of expertise. It is, however, considerably less clear 
whether a lawyer not admitted to practice in Delaware would also be competent to opine on contracts 
themselves governed by Delaware law. Controversies apparently arise, for example, when a non-
Delaware lawyer is asked to opine on the enforceability of an operating agreement that governs a 
Delaware limited liability company. An operating agreement may be a contract more complex, nuanced 
and subject to localized interpretation than the comparatively standardized Delaware corporation charter 
and bylaws. See id. (discussing disputes of this type). 
150. Interview with Attorney S-1, supra note 87, at 15. 
151. The enforceability opinion is “the toughest opinion to give and often the toughest one that I’ve 
ever thought to justify . . . because in essence what you’re asking is for the lawyer for the borrower or 
the lawyer for the seller or whatever to say that the document prepared by the lender’s lawyer is or isn’t 
enforceable.” Id. at 5. 
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me to tell you that it works. I’ve never understood the justification for that.152 
Another attorney expressed the same point in dollars and cents: “[L]ook, 
you’re paying your [recipient’s] lawyers [to draft the documents], . . . why do 
you need [Company counsel] to tell you they are enforceable?”153 Nor was this 
view confined to lawyers who represented borrowers. “[I]f I’m representing the 
lender,” one lawyer with a lending practice observed, “I’ve drafted the damn 
documents—they’re my documents. I’ve used them over and over again. I do 
know, or should know, whether or not they work.”154 
It is obvious that the lawyer for the borrower would not usually be in an 
especially good position to provide an opinion on the enforceability of the loan 
agreement. The same will be true whenever a lawyer is asked to opine on the 
enforceability of a document she did not draft. Nevertheless, U.S. practice often 
requires this seemingly inefficient division of labor. Interestingly, it appears 
that this division of labor has not always been standard in U.S. practice.155 
Several lawyers who began practice in the 1940s and 1950s indicated that 
lawyers for both the borrower and the lender would provide an opinion to the 
lender at closing.156 Indeed, according to one lawyer, one prominent U.S. bank 
made it a condition to closing that it receive an opinion on the Company’s 
authority and the enforceability of the transaction, not from the Company’s 
counsel, but from its own counsel.157 This practice may persist with respect to 
at least one “aberrant” U.S. bank.158 Another lawyer suggested that in the past, 
the enforceability opinion was given by counsel to both the Company and the 
lender.159 
 
152. See Interview with Attorney H-1 (May 1, 2004), transcript at 6. He had greater enthusiasm for 
the due authority opinion: 
I, as the lawyer for the borrower, am in a much better position to know, or at least to find out, 
if I hadn’t otherwise represented the company, whether the company was duly organized; 
whether the resolutions are right. I have much better access to that than you do as the lender. 
So I don’t think it’s inappropriate to ask me to give you an opinion about those things that 
relate to my client. 
Id. 
153. Interview with Attorney V-1, supra note 88, at 10. 
154. Interview with Attorney C-1, supra note 58, at 8. 
155. It is also interesting to note that opinion-giving duties are divided differently in England. See 
Geoffrey Yeowart, Principles for Giving Opinion Letters on English Law in Financing Transactions, 
BUTTERWORTH’S J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 164, 167 (May 2003); see also Interview with Attorney B-
1, supra note 111, at 1 (“[M]y understanding is that the pattern in the London market or the custom in 
the London market is the reverse. That is, in the London market my understanding is that the norm is 
that Lender’s counsel gives the opinion and not borrower’s counsel.”); Interview with Attorney R-1, 
supra note 143, at 7 (“U.K. practice generally has been that the lender’s counsel does give the 
opinion.”). 
156. See, e.g., Interview with Attorney H-1, supra note 152, at 3. 
157. Interview with Attorney E-1 (Sept. 15, 2004), transcript at 6. 
158. One prominent lending lawyer noted that he knew of at least one large bank that “actually 
requires its counsel to give an enforceability opinion, as well as borrower’s counsel opinion.” Interview 
with Attorney B-1, supra note 111, at 1. He acknowledged, however, that “that is an aberration.” Id. 
159. “[A]t one time, both lawyers, both sides gave the opinion . . . . It has withered away . . . I’m 
speculating, in part because [the lenders’ lawyers] decided ‘why would we take the risk, why should we 
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Lawyers sometimes justify the dynamics of the giving of the enforceability 
opinion on the grounds that the lender’s lawyer (usually New York counsel) 
wants to make sure that the loan and other agreements would be enforceable as 
if the local law of the borrower (rather than the chosen law) applied.160 Because 
the Company’s counsel is (or is thought to be) familiar with the local law 
applicable to the Company, the Company’s counsel is said to be in the best 
position to provide the enforceability opinion as if their own state’s law 
applied.161 
There are, however, at least two problems with this explanation. First, there 
is no particular reason to assume that Company counsel’s familiarity with local 
law will exceed, in value, bank counsel’s familiarity with its own form. Indeed, 
there is a good chance that the repeat-playing bank lawyer has already dealt 
with the choice-of-law question in that jurisdiction.162 Second, and more 
importantly, it is likely that the choice of New York law will be upheld, 
especially if (as is usually the case) at least one party (e.g., the bank) has some 
connection to New York.163 In other words, it is not clear that there is much 
value in anticipating what a court, acting under the borrower’s law, would do 
 
give it when we’re not getting paid for it?’” Interview with Attorney G-1, supra note 103, at 8. 
160. Interview with Attorney B-1, supra note 111, at 3 (“[W]hat I have done on occasion is gotten 
the borrower’s counsel to give an opinion that would say something like, let’s say the company’s in 
Kansas, to say that if an action was brought on the agreement in the courts of Kansas, the courts of 
Kansas would respect the New York governing law provision and provided, however, that if the courts 
of Kansas, notwithstanding the New York governing law provision chose to apply Kansas law, the 
agreement would be legal, valid, binding and enforceable.”). 
161. “[Y]ou want to know that in Maine, to have a deal [be] effective, you have to use blue paper 
or wide margins or have it signed with two witnesses or any of these kind of odd state law 
requirements.” Interview with Attorney G-2, supra note 142, at 3; see also GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra 
note 2, § 9.12.3, at 284 (recipients may seek “an opinion that the agreement would be enforceable . . . if 
[the Company’s] state’s law were to be applied instead of the law chosen by the parties.”). 
 A lawyer for a number of New York banks has observed that lawyers in North Carolina—home of, 
among others, Bank of America—have recently become expert on New York law, or at least sufficiently 
expert to review and accept opinions on New York law, even though their practice is concentrated in 
North Carolina. “One of the things that has developed is that Charlotte, North Carolina has become a 
major banking center because two of the major banks in America have headquarters there, but the 
marketplace expects agreements to be governed by New York law and so the lawyers in North Carolina 
kind of have to practice New York law.” This attorney observes that these lawyers are typically licensed 
to practice in both New York and North Carolina. Interview with Attorney D-1, supra note 76, at 3. 
162. “The notion that [Name Omitted] in New York who does bond financing over and over and 
over again gives me a 150 page bond document and I’m going to tell them whether it is or isn’t 
enforceable—it’s kind of silly to be honest with you—I don’t see it. Ask your own counsel.” Interview 
with Attorney S-1, supra note 87, at 15. 
163. EUGENE F. SCHOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.6, at 872 (3d ed. 2000) (permitting 
parties to choose New York law “afford[s] parties the opportunity to select a sophisticated body of 
commercial law and a judicial system with substantial experience . . . .”). One lawyer had the following 
observation about the choice-of-law rationale: 
I think [the choice-of-law rationale] is even more of a stupid duel where you’ve got the credit 
agreements drafted by New York counsel imposing the choice of law on somebody in 
Pennsylvania or wherever and then trying to insist that they give blessing that there is nothing 
that they would challenge in that state. There is a logic to it [but] it’s a very annoying process. 
Interview with Attorney T-1 (June 6, 2004), transcript at 17. 
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because courts would not disregard the chosen law. 
A more common justification for the enforceability opinion is that it results 
in a check on the drafter’s work, a “second set of eyes” reviewing the 
documents.164 But this explanation also presents problems. The inference is that 
in the absence of an opinion, the borrower’s counsel would not review the 
documents to determine enforceability. But that seems unlikely given the 
general level of professionalism required of all lawyers.165 Moreover, this 
explanation assumes that the borrower’s counsel would have sufficient 
expertise and independence to review the documents in a way that would in 
fact be helpful to the recipient. This does not appear terribly realistic, given the 
overarching duty that the borrower’s counsel has to her client. 
Nor do courts appear inclined to impose liability for errors in an 
enforceability opinion where the mistake can fairly be traced to the recipient’s 
counsel. In the Prudential Insurance case,166 for example, the Prudential 
Insurance Company agreed to restructure $92 million in ship mortgages issued 
by United States Lines (“USL”). Unfortunately, a typographical error made by 
counsel to one of the lenders caused the mortgage to be recorded in the stated 
amount of around $92,000, not $92 million.167 After USL went into 
bankruptcy, the error was discovered and USL’s bankruptcy trustee challenged 
the mortgage under the “strong-arm” clause of the Bankruptcy Code.168 
Although Prudential settled the matter with USL’s bankruptcy trustee, it did so 
at a loss of more than $11 million.169 
Prudential sued both its counsel (Dewey Ballantine) and counsel to USL, 
Gilmartin, Poster & Shafto, which had provided a third-party closing opinion to 
 
164. Interview with Attorney K-2, supra note 57, at 3. 
165. This is, as discussed below, often characterized as a form of “professional pride.” See 
discussion infra Part IV.B. 
166. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318, 319 
(N.Y. 1992), aff’g 573 N.Y.S.2d 981 (App. Div. 1991). 
167. The error was apparently caused by the firm of Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens (Haight), 
counsel to one of the lenders (General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC)) and “special admiralty 
counsel” to Prudential. 573 N.Y.S.2d at 983. According to affidavits submitted in the lower court, 
Haight’s staff prepared the document containing the approximately $92 million error. Id. at 984 (Haight 
“admits that the ‘typographical error [occurred] on a word processor in [Haight’s] office.’” (citation 
omitted)). Ironically, after it was determined that the Prudential mortgage was improperly recorded (due 
to GECC’s counsel’s error), GECC—in a display of breathtaking gall—moved for a partial summary 
judgment declaring the mortgage to be invalid for anything over the stated amount of $92,885.00 
(presumably to obtain a step up in priority). Needless to say, GECC was not successful. See Prudential 
Ins. Co. v. Am. Lancer, S.S., 686 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 870 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1989). 
168.  573 N.Y.S.2d at 984 (“While we find it clear from the record that [the parties] knew that the 
correct amount of Prudential’s mortgage . . . was $92,885,000 rather than $92,885, under the 
peculiarities of the bankruptcy and maritime law those parties could challenge the amount of that 
mortgage, even though they had actual knowledge of the facts.”). 
169. Prudential gave up 17.5% of the net proceeds ($11,400,000) from a foreclosure sale of five of 
the ships to USL’s bankruptcy trustee. Prudential also sought attorneys’ fees from its defense of the 
mortgages and other damages. 605 N.E.2d at 319. 
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Prudential.170 After concluding that Gilmartin had a sufficient relationship with 
Prudential to warrant imposition of a duty,171 the court then considered whether 
the firm breached it. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that—despite 
the error—it did not: 
[T]he purpose of an opinion letter, as correctly spelled out by defendant, is to offer 
assurances to the creditor about the inner workings of the borrower’s business. . . . 
An examination of the opinion letter reveals that, although it did not make the 
specific assurance of a dollar amount of security, it did fulfill its purpose of assuring 
procedural regularity in forming the opinion . . . . [T]he letter simply stated that 
those documents represented “legal, valid and binding” obligations of U.S. Lines, 
which, once recorded, would be enforceable against it “in accordance with [their] 
respective terms,” whatever those terms might be. No specific dollar amount was 
assured.172 
The result in Prudential is normatively appealing to opinion-giving 
lawyers, but this passage suggests the court did not fully understand the nature 
of the opinion that was given. Closing opinions about the “inner workings” of a 
borrower’s business will be the due authority and perhaps the no-violations 
opinions discussed above, about which lawyers seem comparatively sanguine. 
However, the opinion in issue here—that the contacts were “legal, valid and 
binding”—went not solely to the status of the borrower, but also to the 
agreements into which it entered. While it is undoubtedly true that the opinion 
did not “assure” a “specific dollar amount,” it would appear equally true that 
the opinion failed to perform the informational function an economic analysis 
would suggest. It may be that in a narrow sense the opinion was “correct”—the 
mortgage was “enforceable” (albeit not in the amount the parties expected). But 
this seems somewhat formalistic. A more plausible explanation may be 
solicitude for lawyers placed in the unenviable position of having to provide an 
enforceability opinion on defective documents that they did not prepare.173 
Lawyers suggest that, at least outside of the financing context, there is 
increasing willingness to waive the enforceability opinion. Several lawyers 
observed that parties with roughly equal bargaining power in an asset sale may 
dispense with the enforceability opinion. As one lawyer explained: 
[I]f both sides are asked to give essentially the same opinion regarding 
[enforceability], . . . there is a view that, well, each one of us can do the due 
diligence and not necessarily rely on those client’s representations and warranties in 
the agreement and therefore neither of us will give the opinion because it would 
 
170. The opinion letter apparently included standard enforceability language, for example, an 
assurance that the mortgage documents represented “legal, valid and binding” obligations of USL. 
“Moreover, according to Gilmartin's [opinion] letter, neither Federal nor State law would interfere ‘with 
the practical realization of the benefits of the security intended to be provided’ by those documents.” Id. 
171. Id. at 322 (“[T]he bond between Gilmartin and Prudential was sufficiently close to establish a 
duty of care running from the former to the latter.”). 
172. Id. at 322-23 (emphasis supplied). 
173. The Gilmartin firm, itself, appears to have weathered the storm. See Gilmartin, Poster & 
Shafto LLP, http://www.gpslaw.com/attorneys.jsp (last visited Sept. 15, 2005). 
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typically be mutual.174 
Another lawyer observed a similar phenomenon in the securities context, 
noting that: 
[T]he underwriters used to include in their laundry list of everything they wanted an 
enforceability opinion. And I believe that over the years they finally realized that 
that was a really stupid thing to ask for because it caused people like me to have to 
take a bunch of exceptions and basically provide a road map for what might not be 
enforceable in the agreement. These days, I don’t think they ask for an 
enforceability opinion, which makes sense because after all, the underwriting 
agreement is drafted by the [underwriter].175 
But enforceability opinions apparently remain important in novel or more 
complex transactions. In securitizations and structured financings, for example, 
lawyers are frequently asked to offer a variant of the enforceability opinion, 
and state that the property transferred in the transaction will not become part of 
the bankruptcy estate of the Company should the Company declare bankruptcy. 
Although these “true sale” opinions are somewhat specialized, they are also 
controversial because, among other reasons, lawyers suggest that they add little 
informational value to the transaction. For example, one Boston lawyer had the 
following observations about the true sale opinion frequently sought in these 
transactions: 
[T]he true sale opinions strike me as a sort of magnificent example of the silliness 
of opinions. Because what you’ve got is . . . a completely academic exercise. You 
lay out the law in the discussion— . . . and then you lay out the facts and the facts 
actually say pretty much the same thing in every opinion, with little wrinkles of 
course. And then you say, “Oh, there’s this thus and such factor which actually 
might cut the other way” and that’s just to show that you’re actually thinking about 
it. And then you get to the end and you say, “Well, of course we can’t absolutely 
say it for sure, but our best judgment is such and such is going to happen.” And 
everybody says, “Great,” and they stick it in a drawer. And it’s absolutely 
meaningless. I mean, if you really look at it carefully, it says nothing.176 
 A full discussion of the peculiar virtues and vices of true sale (and related) 
opinions is beyond the scope of this paper. Professor Schwarcz, a specialist in 
true sale opinions from his many years in practice, has offered an aggressive 
 
174. Interview with Attorney K-3, supra note 85, at 2; see also discussion at note 141, supra, on 
the relationship between the dollar value of transactions and the opinion requirement. 
175. Interview with Attorney W-4, supra note 101, at 3; see also GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, 
§ 9.14.2, at 311 (“[T]he trend has been toward limiting the opinion on the underwriting agreement to an 
opinion that the agreement has been duly authorized, executed and delivered.”). 
176. Interview with Attorney K-1, supra note 102, at 12. Historically, these opinions were required 
in these types of transactions by bond rating agencies, such as Moody’s and S&P. See, e.g., Standard & 
Poor’s, CMBS Legal and Structured Finance Criteria 99-101 (May 1, 2003). Apparently, rating 
agencies are placing less emphasis on these opinions. See William H. Widen, Lord of the Liens: 
Towards Greater Efficiency in Secured Syndicated Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1577 n.3, 1577-
78 (2004) (citing Dina Moskowitz, Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: New Standard 
& Poor’s Criteria, Standard & Poor’s, June 1, 2001). Although the transactions in issue in Enron were 
not traditional securitizations, the opinions appear to have been “true sale” or “true issuance” opinions, 
and not the simpler opinions on authority, etc. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Lit., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 704 
(S.D. Tex. 2002); see also Enron Final Report, supra note 15, at 48-55, app. C, at 179-202, annex 1, at 
25-31. 
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defense of lawyers who issue these opinions, asserting that “there is nothing 
inherently deceptive or illegal about them or the structured-finance transactions 
on which they opine.”177 Professor Coffee has responded, observing that these 
“heavily qualified opinions . . . drone on endlessly like second-rate law review 
articles.”178 The lawyer quoted immediately above may lean towards Professor 
Coffee’s view of things. “[N]ot only [does the true sale opinion] say[] nothing,” 
this attorney observed, “it says the same nothing in every opinion, so why 
bother? If you really wanted to start getting rid of opinions, that would be a 
pretty good place to start.”179 
B. Substantive and Procedural Limitations on Closing Opinion Practice 
Other challenges to the value of closing opinions are presented by their own 
internal limitations, as well as the process by which they are rendered. 
1. Qualifications 
Third-party closing opinions are rarely offered without qualification. 
Rather, they are typically qualified or limited in sometimes significant and 
substantive ways. For example, the TriBar model limits the opinion giver’s 
statements of fact with qualifications on the source and verification of 
information contained in the opinion.180 It makes clear that the scope of the 
factual investigation undertaken by the opinion giver cannot be ascertained 
from the letter, itself. “For purposes of this opinion letter,” it provides, “we 
have reviewed such documents and made such other investigations as we have 
deemed appropriate.”181 
 
177. See Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 6. The defense is aggressive—and curious—because there have 
been few credible claims that true sale opinions in themselves are misleading. Rather, most criticism of 
this sort has been limited to Enron and a few notable cases in which there have been claims of serious 
financial misconduct by companies engaged in structured finance transactions. See id. at 2 n.1 
(collecting citations of criticisms of lawyers in Enron and Dynegy, among others). It is not, however, 
apparent that one can extrapolate from these criticisms of specific lawyers in arguably unusual 
circumstances to the general claim that all lawyers engaged in this practice are under attack. 
178. John C. Coffee, Jr., Can Lawyers Wear Blinders?: Gatekeepers and Third-Party Opinions, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 60, 66 (2005). 
179. Interview with Attorney K-1, supra note 102, at 12. Professor Schwarcz would presumably 
defend by arguing that a true sale opinion does reduce information asymmetries. Despite the fact that 
“recipients of such opinions often have the same factual information as opining counsel,” Schwarcz 
argues, “opining counsel assesses certain legal consequences of that information for the opinion 
recipients.” Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 11 n.54. I note that this may be so, but does not address the 
question whether these opinions add value. One might think that they suffer the same flaws as the more 
general enforceability opinions discussed in this section. Since counsel for the recipient will usually 
have drafted the operative documents (e.g., the pooling and servicing agreement) and have as much, if 
not more, expertise in securitization, it is not clear why opining counsel’s assessment adds value. 
180. See TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, app. A-1, at 667. 
181. Id. As a matter of customary practice, opinion givers will typically review a standard set of 
documents, including the documents that caused the Company to be formed, documents indicating the 
Company’s current existence, other material contracts, the operative agreements for the transaction in 
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The opinion will also likely qualify the veracity of the information. “As to 
certain matters of fact material to the opinions expressed herein, we have relied 
on the representations made in the . . . Agreement and certificates of . . . 
officers of the Company . . . .”182 It is not clear how literally one should take 
this statement, since it is highly likely that the opining lawyer was, in fact, the 
drafter of both the representations in the operative agreement as well as the 
certificates signed by the Company’s officers.183 At least in theory, the opining 
lawyers will have reviewed these certificates with the Company’s officers in 
order to “satisfy themselves that the persons providing the factual information 
understand that the information provided is being relied on in an opinion letter 
and therefore must be based on knowledge, not surmise . . . .”184 While we 
cannot be certain, there is some reason to believe that in many cases something 
approaching this is done.185 
It is presumably important to emphasize that the officer has been walked 
through the certificates because the model opinion then goes on to say that 
“[w]e have not independently established the facts so relied on.”186 This 
qualification is curious because it would seem to be untrue in many cases.187 If 
“independently establishing the facts” means learning firsthand or from others 
(besides the officers of the Company) that a certain state of affairs exists, it 
would seem likely that, notwithstanding the qualification, this happens 
frequently. Opining counsel may well take notice of such obvious facts as the 
existence of the physical plant in which the Company does business and that 
 
question, and so on. But there is no way, from an opinion with this language, that one could know which 
documents were reviewed, or whether other documents might also have been important. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. § 2.1.3, at 609 (“Opinion preparers typically draft certificates that set forth with precision 
various key facts.”) (internal footnote omitted). 
184. Id. 
185. It is not, however, clear that stating assumptions about facts made will necessarily protect a 
lawyer from liability should the assumption prove incorrect. One lawyer had the following observation: 
In a syndicated loan transaction where an opinion is out in the marketplace, people hear about 
it. There are transactions that I know about that were litigated that people gave opinions on 
and the opinions turned out to be wrong and in some cases or in a couple of cases that I 
certainly know, it wasn’t the lawyer’s fault, it was because the assumptions, which were 
reasonable assumptions[,] turned out to be incorrect. The assumptions were assumptions 
which the opinion recipient accepted. 
Interview with Attorney B-1, supra note 111, at 10-11. 
186. See TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, app. A-1, at 667. 
187. It nevertheless appears to be effective. In Prudential Insurance Co., discussed in Part III.A, 
supra, a firm gave a third-party closing opinion as to the enforceability of a $92 million ship mortgage 
which—due to a typographical error—was recorded in the amount of $92,000. Although the New York 
Court of Appeals concluded that the opining firm owed a duty of care to the recipient lender, the duty 
was not breached because, among other reasons: 
The opinion letter initially made clear that, in rendering its opinion, Gilmartin [the firm issuing 
the opinion] had relied in part upon certificates of certain public officials and corporate 
officers, and upon corporate documents and records, with respect to the accuracy of material 
factual matters which were not independently established. 
605 N.E.2d 318, 323 (N.Y. 1992) (emphasis in original). 
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the Company’s officers are who they purport to be. These facts will, in some 
sense, be “established independently” by the lawyer. Nevertheless, the 
qualification is not considered wrong because it “should be regarded as 
included solely as a matter of emphasis since that reliance [on information 
provided by the Company] is customary without any express statement.”188 
Opinions are qualified not only as to fact, but also as to law, and in 
particular, law that may, in some important respect, impair or impede the 
transaction. Closing opinions are, by their terms, typically offered “subject to 
bankruptcy, insolvency and other similar laws affecting the rights and remedies 
of creditors generally and general principles of equity.”189 The exception 
“excludes from the opinion the effect of laws affecting the rights and remedies 
of creditors generally that might prevent the opinion recipient from enforcing 
its rights under the agreement if the company were to encounter financial 
difficulties.”190 It is not hard to see why this qualification is included. 
Commencement of a bankruptcy case for the Company may mean, among other 
things, that the lender-recipient is paid less than the full amount of the loan, or 
that a secured creditor will be delayed (and perhaps denied) in its attempts to 
foreclose on collateral.191 
Qualifications and assumptions obviously exist to protect the opining 
lawyer, but they may not offer as much protection as lawyers would like. In 
Reich Family L.P. v. McDermott, Will & Emery, for example, a New York 
court held that the “equitable principles” qualification was ineffective to 
insulate a firm from liability, even though its opinion had been found in error in 
an equitable proceeding.192 The equitable principles limitation is a constraint on 
the enforceability opinion (or perhaps the entire opinion) to the effect that it is 
subject to “general principles of equity.”193 
 
188. See TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, § 2.6, at 618. In a recent, and unhappy, twist of fate, 
one law firm’s attempt to limit its liability through an explicit knowledge qualifier appears to have 
backfired. In the National Bank of Canada case discussed above, the Massachusetts Superior Court 
denied the firm’s motion for summary judgment on claims by plaintiff banks that the firm had made 
“misrepresentations” in a third-party closing opinion which, among other things, contained an 
(apparently incorrect) opinion that “to our knowledge, there is no action, suit . . . [etc.] which, if 
adversely determined, could have a material adverse effect on the business, condition, affairs[,] or 
operations of [the firm’s client, the borrower].” See Nat’l Bank of Canada v. Hale & Dorr, 2004 WL 
104972, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct., Apr. 28, 2004). The opinion was apparently incorrect because there 
was, at the time, an ongoing patent infringement litigation against the borrower that sought hundreds of 
millions of dollars. One of the attorneys interviewed for this project noted that, while the result “comes 
out correctly,” it was nevertheless a “terribly reasoned opinion obviously written by a . . . trial court 
judge who was a litigator . . . .” Interview with Attorney K-2, supra note 57, at 4. 
189. See TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, app. A-1, at 668. At least according to the practitioner’s 
literature, such an exception would apply even if not expressly stated in the opinion itself. See id. at 623. 
190. GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 9.10.1, at 266. 
191. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3)-(5), 1129(b)(2)(A) (2005) (staying acts to enforce interests in 
property of the debtor’s estate and to “cram down” secured claims). 
192. Reich Family L.P. v. McDermott, Will & Emery, No. 101921-03, 230 N.Y.L.J. 20 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Oct. 29, 2003). 
193. TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, § 3.3.1, at 623. Glazer indicates that the limitation 
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In Reich, the firm of McDermott, Will & Emery was special counsel to a 
financially distressed company. An investor, Reich, demanded as a condition to 
an investment in the company that its founder, Adlerstein—who was the CEO, 
chairman of the board, and majority shareholder—be ousted. This was 
accomplished pursuant to a transaction which, McDermott, Will & Emery 
opined, had been duly authorized.194 Not surprisingly, Adlerstein, the CEO, 
sued the company and the other directors. He won on the grounds that he 
lacked notice of the meeting at which the investment and his ouster occurred.195 
Reich thus lost his investment. He then sued McDermott, Will & Emery, 
claiming its due authority opinion was wrong. The New York Supreme Court 
agreed with Reich, despite the law firm’s defense based on the presence of an 
equitable limitations clause in the opinion.196 The equitable principles 
limitation did not protect McDermott, Will & Emery because, the court 
reasoned, it “applies by its terms to issues of good faith and fair dealings 
between the parties to the agreement, not to the [CEO’s] lawsuit seeking to 
invalidate the results of the July 9th meeting.”197 
Though it is not clear what this means, the court got to the right result. 
According to the practitioner’s literature, this limitation would not appear to 
apply to inequitable conduct leading up to a closing. Rather, it applies to a post-
closing determination by a court not to enforce (or otherwise to recognize) an 
element of a transaction on equitable grounds. It “relates to those principles 
courts apply when, in light of facts or events that occur after the effectiveness 
of an agreement, they decline in the interest of equity to give effect to particular 
provisions in the agreement.”198 Thus, while it is true that the equitable 
principles limitation should not have applied to Adlerstein’s lawsuit seeking to 
invalidate the improperly called board meeting, this was not because, as the 
court suggested, the limitation “applies by its terms to issues of good faith and 
fair dealings.”199 Rather, it was simply because the inequitable conduct there 
preceded—and thus precluded—a transaction that the legal opinion 
(incorrectly) claimed was authorized. 
Qualifications and assumptions appear to have been especially important in 
Enron’s transactions. The Examiner’s Final Report indicates that certain of 
Vinson & Elkins’ “true issuance [opinions] . . . assumed . . . [that] a court 
would not recharacterize the entire transaction, when viewed in its entirety, as a 
 
originally applied to the enforceability opinion. More recently, however, “a practice has developed 
among some lawyers of drafting the limitation to qualify all the opinions in their closing opinions rather 
than simply the enforceability opinion.” GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 9.9, at 261. 
194. Adlerstein v. Wertheimer, No. CIV. A. 19101, 2002 WL 205684 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2002). 
195. See id. (discussing underlying litigation). 
196. Reich Family, 230 N.Y.L.J. at 20. 
197. Id. 
198. See 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 6, § 3.3.4, at 625 (emphasis supplied). 
199. Reich Family, 230 N.Y.L.J. at 20. 
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loan.”200 David Keyes, a Vinson & Elkins attorney involved in many Enron 
transactions, claimed that this assumption was there to “‘put people on notice 
[that] we’re not giving a true sale opinion.’”201 This was important because it 
appears that Vinson & Elkins believed it could not give a true sale opinion—
even though, according to the Examiner, that was the opinion that the 
transactions in question called for.202 Vinson & Elkins’ “‘no recharacterization’ 
assumption would,” according to the Examiner, “thus be assuming away the 
very issue that a true sale opinion purported to address—whether the 
transaction was really a sale or a loan.”203 Whatever else may be true of Enron 
and its lawyers, it would appear that qualifications and assumptions in closing 
opinions undercut their informational value. 
2. Process Problems: Timing and Heterogeneous Expectations 
Closing opinions are, to a significant extent, creatures of customary 
practice. Among other things, this means that opinions at a functional level are 
written and delivered in much the same way as other documents used in a large 
business transaction.204 In a typical modern transaction, the third-party closing 
opinion will be one of several exhibits to the “main” operative document (e.g., 
the loan agreement). In its initial form, it will usually be delivered by 
recipient’s counsel to the attorney expected to provide the opinion (i.e., counsel 
to the company). 
Depending on the nature of the transaction, the parties may simultaneously 
be conducting legal due diligence and negotiating business aspects of the deal. 
When all goes well, the lawyers will negotiate the opinion as part of this 
process. Thus, if an important term in the contract changes, or due diligence 
produces surprising information, the lawyers with principal responsibility 
should take that into account in the opinion. As the designated closing date 
approaches, the paperwork, which includes the opinion itself, is finalized, and a 
 
200. Enron Final Report, supra note 15, app. C, at 34-35. For example, in “Project Cornhusker”—a 
transaction which purportedly involved a “true issuance” of certain securities—Vinson & Elkins’ 
opinion “contained the assumptions that a court would not ‘(i) recharacterize the issuance of the Class B 
Membership Interest by NBIL . . . as a loan to NBIL supported by a security interest in [its] Class B 
Membership Interest, or (ii) recharacterize the [t]ransactions as a loan to Northern Plains supported by a 
security interest in the [financial assets].’” Id. at 35 n.99 (citation omitted). 
201. Id. at 35 (quoting Sworn Statement of David Keyes, Vinson & Elkins, to Mary C. Gill, Alston 
& Bird, Oct. 1, 2003, at 85). 
202. Id. at 34 n.98 (“Keyes . . . remarked to Arthur Andersen [Enron’s accountants] . . . that he 
believed that they were requesting the wrong opinions . . . . [Keyes] didn’t think what they [Andersen] 
were asking for was what his reading of the corporate rules required.” (quoting Sworn Statement of 
Ronald T. Astin, Vinson & Elkins, to Rebecca Lamberth, Alston & Bird, Aug. 12, 2003, at 36-37)). 
203. Id. at 35 (citation omitted). 
204. The discussion in this subsection is drawn from the interviews conducted and my own 
experience as a corporate lawyer, as well as such useful sources as FREUND, supra note 23. A nice, brief 
discussion of certain aspects of the larger process of documenting complex business transactions is set 
forth in Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in ‘Legalese,’ 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (2001). 
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location is designated as a repository for the documents. At closing, the parties 
typically confirm that there have been no material changes in the interim, and 
then execute and deliver the documents, including the third-party closing 
opinion, as it may have been refined and agreed to by the parties (or, more 
likely, the lawyers). 
Of course, things do not always go well and the closing opinion is 
sometimes viewed as the culprit. Lawyers observe that closing opinions are not 
always negotiated or discussed during the development of the other aspects of 
the transaction. Rather, they are left to the end of the transaction. Sometimes, 
this may be because the recipient failed to provide the form it wanted early on; 
other times it may be because the opining lawyer has failed to focus on it. 
Either way, last-minute changes to the transaction may well affect the opinion. 
Another source of delay may come from the way that the opinion-giving 
firm handles opinions. Some firms, for example, have policies that require all 
opinions (or opinions in transactions of a certain size or type) to be reviewed 
and approved by a standing opinion committee in the firm.205 Other firms 
require “second-partner” review. Here, the idea is that an attorney, who is not 
necessarily an expert on opinion writing, is apprised of the transaction and the 
opinion to be delivered.206 In either case, even if counsel began to discuss the 
opinion early on in the transaction, its resolution may be delayed until the last 
moment due to these institutional procedures. 
Although the market-signaling view of closing opinion practice discussed 
above equates value with indicia of procedural regularity, this procedural 
regularity will be achieved in a cost-effective way only if the lawyers share 
expectations and a certain level of sophistication about the appropriate opinions 
to request and receive in the transaction. This is not always the case. Several 
lawyers from large firms, for example, indicated that they would be concerned 
when working with an attorney from a small firm or a firm with an 
unsophisticated practice who signed an opinion in exactly the form requested—
without any challenge or negotiation: 
I think everybody has done deals with [a] lawyer who basically, you give him a 
template of the opinion and he gives it back to you with the law firm’s name 
stamped at the top. It’s nice that I got what I asked for, but no thought went into this 
 
205. As Attorney W-3 explained: 
We have a policy within our firm that when third-party opinions are given, the opinion has to 
be signed off on in a particular way by various people, including a member of the Opinion 
Committee, and we have a number of people in the firm who form that committee and are 
supposed to look at the opinion not really as a matter of the substance of the opinion—is it 
right or wrong—per se, so much as to make sure that it conforms to the types of things we will 
and won’t put in opinions—the way we try to say things. Also, to try to identify issues the 
person . . . writing may not be aware of. 
Interview with Attorney W-3 (May 5, 2004), transcript at 7. 
206. See Interview with Attorney B-1, supra note 111, at 12. 
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. . . . [W]hat can I do [with this]?207 
As another lawyer said, “If I get an opinion back that is verbatim [of] what 
I asked for, . . . it invariably has an effect on [my view of] the quality of 
diligence.”208 An opinion signed in this way “would give me pause,” one 
lawyer said, because “you want to know that the opinion provider has thought 
through the opinion issues . . . . [I]f they are just signing a piece of paper so 
their client can get the loan, you might want to take additional steps to make 
sure you’re comfortable.”209 The effect will generally be to cause the lawyer to 
scrutinize the opinion-giver’s work more carefully. This would seem likely to 
increase cost, not reduce it.210 
Even among sophisticated lawyers, differing expectations can lead to costly 
disputes over closing opinions. “[L]awyers who understand the parties’ 
expectations for opinions,” one lawyer observed, “are willing to step to the 
plate and go through the analysis that needs to be done to give the opinion.”211 
Lawyers who do not, however, can create costly problems. As this same lawyer 
observed, “it is not good lawyers who make opinion practice difficult, it is bad 
lawyers.”212 “Bad” in this context means lawyers who fail to appreciate proper 
closing opinion decorum, who make last-minute changes or demands, or who 
fail to distinguish “big” from “small” issues. 
And, just because a law firm has a large and sophisticated practice does not 
mean that any given lawyer has expertise in opinion writing, especially if the 
attorney is fairly junior. As one lawyer explained, “[a] lot of people simply 
aren’t aware of the niceties of opinion writing.”213 Another attorney (in-house 
counsel for a large public company) explained that when she would 
occasionally receive legal bills indicating what she believed to be an excessive 
amount of time devoted to closing opinions, she would call the firm to ask 
(facetiously): “What associate[s] were we training on this one? Were they 
doing well?”214 A partner in the New York office of a national firm told the 
following anecdote: 
[W]e had a little fight [in one deal] just because there was a very junior lawyer who 
. . . kept saying you have to give all these opinions and some of them didn’t make 
sense. I don’t think PUHCA [the Public Utilities Holding Company Act] mattered 
or the Investment Company Act mattered very much, but they kind of said it did, 
and then finally, you know, we got somebody more senior . . . to say no, down boy, 
 
207. See id. 
208. See id. 
209. Interview with Attorney S-2, supra note 99, at 18. 
210. Interview with Attorney C-1, supra note 58, at 12. 
211. Id. at 23. 
212. Id. 
213. Interview with Attorney W-3, supra note 205, at 7. 
214. Interview with Attorney M-2, supra note 86, at 10. This attorney also noted that this occurred 
infrequently (less than once per year, assuming that she did at least one deal per month), and that outside 
counsel would generally “work it out.” Id. 
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you don’t really need those.215 
C. Externalizing Costs onto Lawyers 
Ordinarily, liability rules address lawyers’ professional errors, and this is as 
true of the closing opinion as any other facet of practice. It is tempting to 
imagine that the threat of lawyer liability adds value to closing opinions. After 
all, if lawyers were not concerned about liability for errors in their opinions, 
they most likely would care less about the quality of their opinions, which 
would in turn undermine their informational value. In fact, the link between 
liability and the informational function of closing opinion practice is elusive. 
Lawyers certainly express great concern about the risk of liability. It is not, 
however, clear that the value created by the risk of liability exceeds the costs it 
creates; nor is it clear that value is created in acceptable ways. As several 
lawyers observed, imposing liability on lawyers for opinion errors may simply 
externalize the risk of transaction failure onto the lawyers, imposing a cost for 
which they believe themselves inadequately compensated. “An opinion,” the 
1998 TriBar Report explains “is not a guaranty of an outcome, but rather an 
expression of professional judgment.”216 
1. Legal Liability 
Historically, legal liability has been something of a puzzle in this area of 
practice. In 1989, Professor Freeman surveyed extant case law, and concluded 
that it “strongly suggest[s] that courts today are willing to go to considerable 
lengths to protect lawyers who assist their business clients, even where the 
lawyer’s assistance furthers client misconduct.”217 And, while there are 
certainly cases in which lawyers have been held liable for opinion errors, 
lawyers suggest that legal liability was historically a somewhat remote concern. 
Today, however, lawyers express increasing anxiety about liability for their 
opinion letters, and find support for this concern in recent decisions.218 
Whatever doctrinal clarity there is in this field comes from the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which provides that the lawyer 
rendering the third-party closing opinion “must exercise the competence and 
diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances.”219 A lawyer 
 
215. Interview with Attorney S-2, supra note 99, at 16. 
216. TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, at 596. 
217. See John P. Freeman, Current Trends in Legal Opinion Liability, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
235, 251. 
218. See GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 1.6.3, at 26-27 (“At one time cases involving closing 
opinions were rare . . . . That is no longer the case.”) (footnote omitted). 
219. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(1) (2000). Note that 
determining what constitutes “similar circumstances” may be difficult. Does the customary practice of 
the lawyers in the opinion-giver’s community apply? Or must the opinion-giver live up (or down) to the 
customary practices of lawyers in the recipient’s community? The Restatement provides little guidance 
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rendering an opinion is expected to possess “the skill and knowledge normally 
possessed by members of that profession . . . in good standing.”220 This does 
not require the lawyer to perform with a high or even an average level of skill, 
as this would “imply that the less skillful part of the profession would 
automatically be committing malpractice.” Rather, the duty “is one of 
reasonableness in the circumstances.”221 
This general standard of care applies to all lawyer-client relationships. The 
Restatement also provides rules on the lawyer’s duty to nonclients, as in the 
rendering of third-party closing opinions. Restatement § 51(2) provides that a 
lawyer owes the foregoing duty of care “to a nonclient when and to the extent 
that: (a) the lawyer or (with the lawyer’s acquiescence) the lawyer’s client 
invites the nonclient to rely on the lawyer’s opinion . . . and the client so relies; 
and (b) the nonclient is not, under applicable tort law, too remote from the 
lawyer to be entitled to protection.”222 
While courts have certainly held attorneys liable to third parties for 
negligent misrepresentations (or similar claims) in the third-party closing 
opinion letter,223 many other courts have not, even when an opinion letter 
apparently contained significant errors.224 At least historically, courts have used 
several doctrinal moves to protect lawyers from liability for errors in their 
opinions. Courts have, for example, exonerated lawyers on theories that the 
recipient should not have relied on the opinion,225 the absence of privity of 
contract,226 or simply that the error itself was not a breach of duty.227 
 
on this point. “The professional community whose practices and standards are relevant in applying [the] 
duty of competence is ordinarily that of lawyers undertaking similar matters in the relevant jurisdiction 
(typically a state).” Id. § 52 cmt. The problem, however, is that the parties’ lawyers may be in different 
states. It would appear inconsistent with the Restatement to hold the opinion-giving lawyer to the 
standards applicable in the recipient’s lawyer’s jurisdiction. Yet, the difference in standards may be 
inconsistent with the recipient’s expectations. Perhaps the answer is, as suggested in the Restatement, 
that many practices which involve opinions are “national” in scope, and so a single standard would 
apply to all lawyers involved in the transaction. Id. Yet, this is unsatisfying because inconsistent with the 
experiences described by practitioners. As discussed below, while there is a trend toward nationalizing 
many types of practice, many small firms in remote locations are often involved in transactions with 
large firms in major cities. The differences in customary practice between them may well be large, even 
if the type of transaction in question is national in character or scope. 
220. Id. § 52 cmt. b (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A). 
221. Id. § 2 cmt. b. 
222. Id. § 51(2). 
223. See, e.g., Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 
(1988); Crossland Savs. FSB v. Rockwood Ins. Co., 700 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying New 
York law); Vereins-Und Westbank, AG v. Carter, 691 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
224. The WPPSS and Prudential cases discussed in Parts II.A.1 and III.A, supra, respectively, are 
good examples of this. See also Council Commerce Corp. v. Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi, 534 N.Y.S.2d 1 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1988); United Bank of Kuwait v. Eventure Energy Enhanced Oil Recovery Assoc., 763 
F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Geaslen v. Berkson, Gorov & Levin, Ltd., 581 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1991). 
225. See, e.g., Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 110 F.3d 1247 (6th Cir. 1997), rev'd en banc, 
143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998). 
226. See, e.g., discussion supra note 123. No discussion of privity is complete without mention of 
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These moves led some to believe that lawyers were most likely to be held 
liable for errors in third-party closing opinions only if the errors were truly 
egregious or were part of a more damning set of facts, such as the NSMC 
scandal discussed above. Thus, the house organ for one of the legal malpractice 
insurers, the Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society (ALAS), noted that “the 
liability danger usually does not lurk in the opinion itself.”228 Rather, client 
fraud or a conflict of interest by the attorney—what some refer to as an “x-
factor”—were the more likely paths to lawyer liability.229 Given the fact-
sensitive nature of these cases, it is not surprising that a pattern is difficult to 
discern.230 
Many of the lawyers interviewed for this project acknowledged that they 
 
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Here, accountants were sued for negligent 
misrepresentation and fraud by creditors of a company who allegedly relied on erroneous financial 
statements prepared by the accountants. Id. at 442. Justice Cardozo famously observed that the 
accountants had no duty of care to the creditors, because they merely constituted an “indeterminate class 
of persons who, presently or in the future, might deal with the [company] in reliance on the audit.” Id. at 
446 (noting that holding the accountants liable to creditors, at least for negligent misrepresentation, 
would, among other things, create unacceptable risks for lawyers). Cardozo explained as follows: 
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many callings other than an 
auditor’s. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to the validity of municipal or corporate bonds 
with knowledge that the opinion will be brought to the notice of the public, will become liable 
to the investors, if they have overlooked a statute or a decision, to the same extent as if the 
controversy were one between client and adviser. 
Id. at 448. 
227. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
228. See William Freivogel, The Ethics and Lawyer Liability Issues Raised by Closing Opinions, 2 
LOSS PREVENTION J. 2 (1998). Information about ALAS may be found at http://www.alas.com. 
229. Id. at 4 (“Client fraud is one danger. Usually, the opinion will have no bearing on the case 
except to support an argument that the author was, in fact, assisting the client in committing the fraud. 
The other real danger is conflicts of interest.”). 
230. In the following cases, there appears to have been no “x-factor” (e.g., no fraud or conflict of 
interest by the lawyers) and no liability for an erroneous opinion: United Bank of Kuwait v. Enventure 
Energy Enhanced Oil Recovery Assoc., 763 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Vanguard Prod., Inc. v. 
Martin et al., 894 F.2d 375 (10th Cir. 1990); Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 
312 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991); 
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Dewey Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318, 320 
(N.Y. 1992); Austin v. Bradley, Barry & Tarlow, P.C., 836 F. Supp. 36 (D. Mass. 1993); Wash. Elec. 
Coop., Inc. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 894 F. Supp. 777 (D. Vt. 1995); Mark Twain Kan. City 
Bank v. Jackson et al., 912 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
 In the following cases, there apparently was no “x-factor” but the lawyers nevertheless were held 
liable for opinion errors: Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (Cal Ct. 
App. 1976); Cambridge Factors v. Sturges & Mathes, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2140 (July 15, 1992); 
Horizon Fin., F.A. v. Hansen, 791 F. Supp. 1561 (N.D. Ga. 1992); Mehaffy et al. v. Cent. Bank Denver, 
892 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1995); Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354 (N.J. 1995). 
 In the following cases, lawyers were found liable (or potentially liable) where their opinions were 
erroneous in the presence of an x-factor: Terremar, Inc. et al. v. Ginsburg & Ginsberg et al., 1991 Conn. 
Super. LEXIS 747 (Apr. 4, 1991) (fraud); Superior Bank FSB v. Golding, 605 N.E.2d 514 (Ill. 1992) 
(forgery). White & Case’s experience in the National Student Marketing Corp. case, discussed, supra, 
would also appear to constitute loss due in part to an “x-factor.” See 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). Of 
course, we do not yet know what will happen in Enron. The Reich decision, discussed above and below, 
may also be an example of an “x-factor,” in that the board apparently failed to act in good faith. See 
Reich Family L.P. v. McDermott, Will & Emery, No. 101921-03, N.Y. Sup. Ct., 230 N.Y.L.J. 20 (Oct. 
29, 2003). 
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personally knew of no lawyers who had been sued for errors in a third-party 
closing opinion and held liable (or settled for more than nominal damages).231 
As one attorney explained, “Empirically it hasn’t been significant in terms of 
the claims against and the ultimate hits on malpractice insurance policies. 
Opinion issues represent a very, very small number” of malpractice claims.232 
Another attorney observed, “I know that establishing malpractice liability 
requires more than that the opinion be wrong, it has to be negligent.”233 Thus, 
he said, “We’ll tell [our clients] the lenders this [opinion] is not a guarantee of 
this, but these good lawyers have done a careful job in giving this opinion, and 
you can take a lot of comfort from that as far as your diligence in determining 
whether the proper steps have been taken to validate this contract.”234 Another 
attorney put it more bluntly (if optimistically): “I know that it is an opinion and 
when all is said and done, you are sort of entitled to be wrong.”235 According to 
several lawyers, historically, institutional clients (in particular, banks) had a 
similar view, as they did not generally treat opinions as liability-creating 
documents.236 If this were true, the threat of liability would add little value, 
because there would in fact be little threat. 
Yet lawyers also express concern about increasing risk of liability for errors 
in their closing opinions. One attorney from a mid-sized West Coast firm 
observed: 
[T]he fact that there aren’t a lot of cases to hold lawyers liable and there isn’t a lot 
of experience of lawyers being sued, doesn’t mean that people aren’t fearful of it 
nevertheless. It’s like fastening your seatbelt on an airplane. I don’t know anyone 
who’s been through a plane crash, much less someone who has been through a 
crash who would not have survived if they weren’t wearing their seatbelt. 
Nevertheless, I buckle my belt low and firm across the lap.237 
Imposing legal liability for opinion errors would “allow[] the lender [in loans] 
to have recourse against another party if . . . it is unable to enforce the loan 
documents. . . . [P]resumably, if the lender has received an opinion from the 
borrower’s counsel, then [the lender] can turn to that counsel and say ‘okay, 
now make us whole for it.’”238 Courts in Massachusetts,239 New York,240 and 
 
231. See, e.g., Interview with Attorney O-1 (May 11, 2004), transcript at 4 (“I don’t know whether 
that’s sort of the last vestiges of gentlemanly behavior among lawyers that we don’t tend to sue on them. 
I’ve never seen an opinion sued o[n in] my practice, although I certainly know there are cases, 
particularly in New York, the last 15 years where there was an opinion sued on . . . .”). 
232. Interview with Attorney C-1, supra note 58, at 4. 
233. Interview with Attorney B-1, supra note 111, at 5. 
234. Id. This sentiment is echoed in the ABA’s Legal Opinions Principles, reprinted as an 
Appendix to the ABA 2002 Guidelines, stating, “The opinions contained in an opinion letter are 
expressions of professional judgment regarding the legal matters addressed and not guarantees that a 
court will reach any particular result.” ABA 2002 Guidelines, supra note 11, § I.C., at 883. 
235. Interview with Attorney O-1, supra note 231, at 4. 
236. See, e.g., Interview with Attorney C-2, supra note 78, at 8. 
237. Interview with Attorney L-1, supra note 142, at 4. 
238. Id. at 2. 
239. Nat’l Bank of Canada v. Hale & Dorr, No. 2000000296, 2004 WL 1049072 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
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Pennsylvania241 have all recently indicated that this may be an appropriate 
result. 
For example, in the Reich Family L.P. case discussed in Part III.B.1, above, 
the lawyers were held liable for errors in a due authority opinion because the 
underlying transaction was challenged on good faith grounds.242 In agreeing 
with the plaintiff, the New York Supreme Court explained: 
The opinion letter stated that each of the transaction documents had been duly 
authorized by all necessary corporate action on the part of the Company. Yet, as a 
result of the decision of the Court of Chancery, the [underlying] transaction was 
invalidated on the basis that the corporation had not provided [CEO] with the 
required notice of the planned transaction.243 
As noted above, closing opinions apparently also played a role in the Enron 
scandal, and may expose Enron’s deal counsel to liability, although this is 
currently far from settled. On the one hand, the Examiner cited them as one of 
the grounds for determining that Vinson & Elkins (V&E) (and perhaps 
Andrews & Kurth (A&K)) could be held liable.244 They have been 
characterized as “crucial” to Enron’s ability to complete many of its 
questionable transactions.245 On other hand, it is not clear how many were truly 
 
Apr. 28, 2004). 
240. Reich Family L.P. v. McDermott, Will & Emery, No. 101921-03, 230 N.Y.L.J. 20, 20 col. 1 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 29, 2003). 
241. See Ruling by Pa. Court Could Set Precedent on Advice to Banks, 169 AM. BANKER 4 (2004), 
2004 WL 55827749. This article discusses the recent unpublished decision in Republic First Bank v. 
Abrahams, Lowenstein and Bushman, No. 0409, March Term 2002 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia July 2, 2004). 
There, lawyers for a bank—who had previously represented the borrower—concealed the fact that the 
borrower lacked the ability to grant a mortgage in a leasehold, because the landlord had withheld its 
consent. Nevertheless, the firm gave the bank an opinion on the enforceability of the mortgage against 
the borrower. In awarding over $4 million in compensatory and punitive damages, the judge indicated 
that “[t]he court is particularly disturbed over the opinion letter,” the issuance of which the court viewed 
as “an outrageous thing to do.” Id. It would appear the opinion here was technically a first party opinion, 
in that the firm that issued the opinion also represented the recipient-bank. Id. 
242. Reich Family, 230 N.Y.L.J. at 20. 
243. Id. Reading between the lines, two additional factors may have influenced the court. First, the 
law firm was apparently involved in advising the directors about the action that led to the ouster of the 
CEO. If the directors were not acting in good faith, perhaps the lawyers were not, either. Second, some 
partners of the law firm owned interests in the company, which interests were not disclosed to Reich. 
Reich claimed that this amounted to fraud by the law firm. Although the New York court disagreed and 
dismissed that claim, the presence of either or both “x-factors” may have contributed to the court’s 
overall view of the firm’s behavior. Ironically, Reich himself was not the most sympathetic character. A 
former partner of the law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Reich was jailed and disbarred for 
participating in the 1980s insider-trading ring led by former Drexel Burnham banker Dennis Levine. He 
served eight months of a 366-day sentence, and was eventually reinstated to the New York bar before 
becoming a private investor. Id. 
244. Neal Batson, one of the Enron Examiners, noted that opinions were in issue in three of the 
nine transactions discussed in the Report that indicated potential liability of V&E. Enron Final Report, 
supra note 15, at 48-49. 
245. See Enron Final Report, supra note 15, app. C, at 27 (“An attorney’s willingness to provide 
certain legal opinions was, as a practical matter, crucial to Enron’s ability to complete” certain 
transactions); see also Rebecca M. Lamberth & Lynn A. Soukup, Summary of the Pertinent Legal 
Framework and Opinion-Related Conclusions of the Enron Examiner, SJ093 ALI-ABA 125, 136 
(American Law Institute—American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, 2004). 
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third-party (as distinct from first-party) closing opinions246 or that by 
themselves they played a significant role in establishing the firm’s exposure. 
After all, if V&E (or A&K) did not issue opinions, it is possible that some other 
law firm would have, thereby costing these firms the work. 
At least in the case of V&E, real exposure may derive from having issued 
the so-called “white-wash report,” in which it approved of these very 
transactions, despite its concerns, and despite its apparent conflict of interest in 
rendering such a report.247 Although other firms performed significant work for 
Enron, or Enron-related entities, only V&E issued this report, and of the law 
firms sued thus far, only V&E failed to get out of the case at the pleadings 
stage. Although Judge Harmon did not say so in her decision on the motion to 
dismiss the securities fraud complaint, it may be that other firms that also 
structured transactions and issued opinions were not liable for securities law 
violations because the documents they drafted were “for private transactions” 
between Enron and its related entities.248 
It is probably too early to draw broad conclusions about closing-opinion 
liability from the Enron scandal.249 Nevertheless, it would appear that, like the 
NSMC scandal before it, Enron has generated a significant amount of anxiety 
about closing opinion practice. Surveying Enron and other recent decisions, 
one prominent attorney suggested that a sea-change may be in the works. He 
indicated that he expected to see more suits against lawyers for alleged errors in 
opinions because “otherwise respectable [transaction] participants are . . . now 
more willing to be plaintiffs . . . .”250 “[P]eople are trying all sorts of wild ways 
to pull lawyers into the transaction,” another lawyer observed, 
 
246. At least some were. See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Lit., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002) 
(discussing opinions issued to J.P. Morgan, among others); see also Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: 
See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 202 (2003) (“Citigroup personnel testified under oath    
. . . that they had two legal opinions, one from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, Citigroup's lawyers, 
and the other from Vinson & Elkins, Enron's lawyers, assuring Citigroup, in one way or the other, that 
its round-and-round deals with Enron were legitimate.”) (citing 2002 WL 1722723 (F.D.C.H.) 
(testimony of Richard Caplan, Managing Director & Co-Head, Credit Derivatives Group, Salomon 
Smith Barney/Citigroup)). 
247. See In re Enron Sec. Lit., 235 F. Supp. 2d at 636 (“Vinson & Elkins issued a whitewash report 
dismissing these detailed complaints of fraud even though the law firm knew the allegations were true 
because it was involved in structuring many of the manipulative devices.”). 
248. See id. at 706 (“Any opinion letters that [Kirkland & Ellis, another defendant law firm] wrote 
are not alleged to have reached the plaintiffs nor been drafted for the benefit of the plaintiffs.”). 
249. Indeed, as John Coffee has observed, any lessons may be difficult to draw from the case: 
[T]he problem with viewing Enron as an indication of any systematic governance failure is 
that its core facts are maddeningly unique. Most obviously, Enron's governance structure was 
sui generis. Other public corporations simply have not authorized their chief financial officer 
to run an independent entity that enters into billions of dollars of risky and volatile trading 
transactions with them; nor have they allowed their senior officers to profit from such self-
dealing transactions without broad supervision or even comprehension of the profits involved. 
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 
1403, 1404 (2002). 
250. Interview with Attorney K-2, supra note 57, at 6. 
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almost [as] aiders and abettors, if you will, of whatever bad thing has happened to 
them because you gave an opinion that says this was okay, and it turned out not to 
be okay, and therefore we were harmed and yes, the company said it was okay, and 
yes, it was the company that has no assets. . . . I . . . think there’s a much higher 
degree of potential litigation risk that surrounds being part of that opinion.251 
Would increased exposure to legal liability result in better opinion practice? 
Not necessarily, according to one lawyer. The apparent trend toward holding 
lawyers liable on opinions means, he said, that “we’ll end up with a lot more 
negotiations taking place as to what are proper, acceptable exceptions and what 
aren’t.”252 But the value of the opinion wouldn’t necessarily change because 
lawyers’ level of diligence and information production will not necessarily 
have changed. “It should,” he said “come out equal” to what it would have been 
in the absence of the increased risk of liability.253 
The economic value of lawyer liability is ultimately difficult to assess. It is 
easy to imagine that the threat of liability keeps lawyers diligent, and that this 
diligence adds value. There are, however, two problems with this proposition. 
First, lawyers often adamantly insist that their care and handling of closing 
opinions is not governed in any significant way by the threat of liability. 
Rather, as one lawyer explained, reputational concerns “drive[] careful opinion 
practice more than potential exposure to liability.”254 At least according to this 
lawyer, the prospect of repeat play, not the risk of loss, may motivate good 
closing opinion practice. 
Second, lawyers suggest that they are not adequately paid to take the risk of 
any significant loss resulting from opinion errors. As one lawyer explained, 
“our pricing doesn’t reflect [third-party opinion liability] as a risk.”255 
[W]e’re not getting paid to take that risk, therefore, one shouldn’t have any risk, in 
theory. You should have risk to your own client, but that’s for true malpractice, for 
failure to do what you’re supposed to do. None of us bargain to have risk with a 
third-party. Why should we bear the risk to that third-party when it’s really the 
client who didn’t pay back the loan or whatever—that’s the cause of the loss? Why 
should it be shifted to our shoulders?256 
Another attorney offered a slightly more sophisticated theory of 
 
251. Id. That said, another attorney observed: 
If you have a crook for a client who is defrauding someone, it doesn’t make any difference 
how well you write the opinion, you’re still going to get nailed. And conflicts of interest—if 
you allow yourself to be identified with too many parties where they can claim they thought 
you were their lawyer and then the wheels come off the deal and people get disadvantaged—
they’ll start looking around for people to sue, and they’ll sue the lawyer for having a conflict. 
You favored the other guy over me. 
Interview with Attorney F-1 (May 20, 2004), transcript at 3. 
252. Interview with Attorney K-2, supra note 57, at 7. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 13. 
255. Interview with Attorney K-3, supra note 85, at 11. 
256. Id. This attorney acknowledged that this was “a visceral reaction. I can’t say that it’s a very 
studied analysis, but it is true. I think I share that same view that we . . . worr[y] about liability . . . but at 
the end of the day, we probably will never have any.” Id. 
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externalization, suggesting that closing opinions may exhibit a form of “reverse 
tying.”257 According to this attorney, opinion practice is: 
A reverse tying arrangement, in that the borrower does not have to buy something 
extra from the bank, but what the borrower does have to do is to run through this 
particular hoop. . . . [w]hich is not its own hoop. It’s someone else’s. Somebody 
else has to run through this hoop—not the borrower.258 
If true, this would help to explain why clients themselves evince little 
interest in improving opinion practice, but may be increasingly willing to sue 
lawyers after the fact. The opinion is not the client’s “problem” (hoop). While 
company managers may not want to pay the legal fees associated with the 
opinion, they are largely indifferent to the entire process because the manager 
“doesn’t understand the intricacies and has no patience with it.”259 “[I]f the 
people who are paying the bills don’t understand what is going on, . . . what 
you have is the mental patients running the institution.”260 The prospect of 
lawyer liability may encourage this indifference, since it gives the client an ex 
post source of recovery that may not have been fully priced in. 
One response may be that lawyers are (or at least believe they are) getting 
paid to take the risk, because they continue to take the work in the face of the 
perception that lawyers will increasingly end up as defendants in a lawsuit 
arising from the transaction. Moreover, they adequately price for this risk, since 
they charge enough to cover malpractice premiums which, in turn, protects 
them against the real risk of (most) legal liability. This counter-argument would 
perhaps find support in the eyes of many clients, who pay significant and rising 
fees to lawyers.261 
2. Reputational Costs 
The case for legal liability in opinion practice is complicated, and it is not 
surprising, as discussed above, that courts have at least historically been 
reluctant to hold lawyers liable for mere errors in their opinions. But lawyers 
are not only concerned about legal liability. Perhaps an even greater concern (at 
least historically) has been reputational damage from providing an opinion that 
turns out, in hindsight, to have been inaccurate. 
Reputational liability describes the shame that might attend the discovery of 
an error in a third-party closing opinion. “I think lawyers are always concerned 
about the reputational aspect of it,” one attorney explained.262 “I think that 
frankly drives careful opinion practice more than potential exposure to [legal] 
 
257. Interview with Attorney G-1, supra note 103, at 26. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. See id. at 8 (“I bet you since 1970 . . . the fee for a partner has gone up 10 times.”). 
262. Interview with Attorney K-2, supra note 57, at 15. 
LIPSON_PRINTED 5/10/2006  1:18:25 PM 
Berkeley Business Law Journal Vol. 3.1, 2005 
110 
liability. At the end of the day, we sell our professional reputation.”263 As 
James Freund observed thirty years ago, “There is no aspect of an acquisition 
that lawyers are more sensitive about than the opinion they are asked to 
provide.”264 
Being perceived as sloppy in opinion writing can have consequences both 
for the lawyer and the client. As to the lawyer, there is presumably the loss of 
repeat business. There may also be broader implications, if word leaks into the 
larger market for legal services, although it is difficult to see how sloppiness in 
opinions alone would have this effect. For clients, “[a] sloppy opinion process 
or wrong opinion process leads to questions of sophistication and 
understanding, which can influence how one approaches a transaction,”265 one 
attorney said. This attorney indicated that he had not seen transactions fall apart 
because of a lawyer’s sloppiness with respect to the opinion, but said it would 
nevertheless affect the nature and amount of work he did in the transaction, 
even though he was representing a different party (e.g., the recipient).266 
Reputational liability is an admittedly complex social and psychological 
phenomenon. First, while lawyers express concern about the effect of errors in 
opinions on their reputations, it is not clear that errors in fact affect reputation 
in any significant way. After all, some of the nation’s more prestigious firms 
have encountered trouble with their opinions, including White & Case, Hale & 
Dorr,267 and Dewey Ballantine. These remain prestigious firms. A related and 
more subtle point (perhaps borne out by the infamous WPPSS and Prudential 
cases discussed above) is that there is a reputational tipping point whereby if 
enough people get it wrong, then no one’s reputation suffers. 
Second, lawyers indicated that it is often very difficult to isolate the effect 
that the opinion has on an attorney’s overall reputation. In other words, a 
lawyer is unlikely to be sloppy only with respect to his or her opinion. Rather, 
the attorney that is careless in drafting the opinion will likely be careless 
elsewhere. Conversely, with the exception of several attorneys who have 
distinguished themselves as “gurus” of opinion practice, being good at this is 
not likely to enhance anyone’s reputation. 
Whether it’s opinions that come up or the contracts themselves or whatever . . . 
people tend to form views [as to] who’s good at this and who’s not good at this. . . . 
[B]ut in terms of real reputations of who’s an opinion guru you have people like 
 
263. Id. 
264. FREUND, supra note 23, at 305 (“Most of us have been up against attorneys who were meek as 
lambs in connection with those elements of the agreement that concerned their clients, but turned into 
veritable tigers when they came to the section on legal opinions.”). 
265. Interview with Attorney C-1, supra note 58, at 12. 
266. See id. (“[M]y reaction, if I get that, is that I’d better be more attentive myself because I have 
less comfort that our inquiries made of the other side are going to be responded to fully—not because of 
any mal-intent, just inattention.”). 
267. Hale & Dorr is now known as Wilmer Hale, following a merger with Wilmer, Cutler & 
Pickering. See http://www.wilmerhale.com/about/history/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). 
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Don Glazer, who have written treatises, they obviously have a profile in the Bar but 
beyond that I couldn’t tell you who the good opinion writers of Sullivan & 
Cromwell are.268 
In short, “no one becomes a rainmaker for writing opinions.”269 
If the value of an opinion lies in the fact that it is evidence that a reputable 
firm has represented the Company, one might also think that the most reputable 
firms could dispense with issuing opinions entirely. That is, they could—like 
investment bankers in the context of firm commitment public offerings—create 
value simply by their presence. The reputation of the firm alone would suffice 
as a signal of probity, diligence, etc. to the putative opinion recipient. Yet, this 
is not how it works out in practice. The fact that a firm already has a top-flight 
reputation does not exempt the firm from having to give opinions on behalf of 
its clients. As one practitioner observed, “[E]very firm that I know of—from 
Cravath on down—every firm that I have done deals with when they represent 
the borrower have given opinions . . . . [T]here is no firm of which I am aware 
that practices in the commercial area that will not give opinions.”270 
Conversely, firms appear reluctant to “sell” their opinions on a transaction, at 
least so long as they do not also do the other work involved in the 
transaction.271 
3. Emotional Costs 
The prospect of legal and reputational liability has, not surprisingly, led 
some lawyers to fear and/or loathe writing third-party closing opinions. Rather 
than viewing this as an opportunity to serve a client (and earn fees), lawyers 
often characterize the opinion process as an “aggravation.”272 Many lawyers 
interviewed seemed to view this aggravation as taking a greater emotional toll 
than other aspects of business law practice (e.g., negotiating and drafting the 
underlying agreements). As one lawyer who moved in-house from a 
partnership at a large firm observed, “When I was outside . . . there [wa]s a 
fairly significant level of anxiety if you [were] working on an unusual opinion 
in a large transaction.”273 This may be because “it’s the lawyer’s own ox that’s 
being gored”274 or, as one attorney prosaically explained, “When a lawyer signs 
an opinion, of any sort, he feels or she feels like . . . she’s putting her ass on the 
line. In a way that it wasn’t on the line by just pushing paper and reading 
 
268. Interview with Attorney W-3, supra note 205, at 12. 
269. Interview with Attorney L-1, supra note 142, at 4; see also Interview with Attorney K-2, 
supra note 57, at 14. 
270. Interview with Attorney B-1, supra note 111, at 6. 
271. As Attorney B-1 observes, “if they want to hire [our firm] because they want to be able to 
deliver our opinion, then hire us to do the deal.” Id. 
272. See, e.g., Interview with Attorney K-2, supra note 57, at 8. 
273. Interview with Attorney M-2, supra note 86, at 17. 
274. Interview with Attorney K-2, supra note 57, at 8. 
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contracts—in drafting contracts.”275 
A related source of anxiety may be that opinion practice has become 
increasingly specialized and esoteric: 
Just as a general corporate lawyer or commercial lawyer wouldn’t try to draft an 
ERISA plan or a collective bargaining agreement. . . . [S]imilarly, I think that over 
the last several decades, opinion practice has become a highly specialized area of 
practice and has become recognized to an extent as an area of specialization and 
expertise. Most firms have their opinion gurus and people who spend a 
disproportionate amount of their time working on opinions, not only for their own 
deals. If you’ve got a hundred business lawyers in your group that do[es] a thousand 
transactions a year, you’re not going to have each one doing 10 opinions.276 
Discomfort with closing opinion practice may arise from a lack of history 
between lawyer and client. “You can really have some anxieties,” one lawyer 
explained, “when you know the client but you don’t really know the client . . . 
[w]here the client is a small individual company say, or a startup.”277 Although 
not “opinion shopping” in a traditional sense, it is nevertheless problematic 
because “these people could be gone tomorrow, but your opinion would still be 
here.”278 
Closing opinion practice can be anxiety-producing even when the lawyer 
has a well-developed relationship with a client. One lawyer told a story of a 
long-time client that used a different firm for a complex transaction. Because 
the other firm did not have a long-standing relationship with the client, the 
other firm asked the client’s long-time outside counsel to provide a due 
authority opinion in the transaction. The lawyer from the long-time counsel 
agreed, grudgingly, to do so. 
[W]e had literally not been involved in the transaction—and so I wasn’t really 
familiar with the documents, and I mean, it was a very peculiar situation to be 
giving an opinion. It was . . . as if I had dropped from the sky and given an opinion. 
And I felt very uncomfortable about it.”279 
For some lawyers—especially those for whom closing opinions are a 
significant portion of practice—the simpler closing opinions are less 
troublesome. A New York lawyer who frequently represents lenders indicated 
that closing opinion practice was not, itself, “that aggravating.”280 This is 
because, in her view, “there is just a better understanding of what’s 
 
275. Interview with Attorney F-1, supra note 251, at 17. When asked about liability, another 
attorney who began practice with a “white shoe” New York firm in the 1950s indicated that liability 
“was the whole name of the game even when I was there. It’s not just something new . . . . You knew the 
firm could be sued if there were a mistake in a legal opinion. That was the end of your career if you got 
the firm sued because there was something in a legal opinion.” Interview with Attorney E-1, supra note 
157, at 27-28. 
276. Interview with Attorney L-1, supra note 142, at 5. 
277. Interview with Attorney M-2, supra note 86, at 18. 
278. Id. 
279. Interview with Attorney K-1, supra note 102, at 17. 
280. Interview with Attorney S-2, supra note 99, at 16. 
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expected.”281 Another lawyer indicated that even with respect to more complex 
true sale opinions in certain types of securitizations, closing opinion practice is 
less fearsome than it once was because “the law has become fairly steady in 
that area. . . . [T]he industry has reached a level of maturity where it is pretty 
clear.”282 
Although the evidence is qualitative, and thus subjective, it would appear 
that closing opinion practice is less likely to create value when it involves 
enforceability opinions, or when (as is often the case) lawyers excessively limit 
or qualify their opinions. Although lawyer liability may be a source of value in 
that it imposes discipline, it presents an uncertain case for value creation, both 
because lawyers have historically not usually been liable for opinion errors per 
se, and because the costs (economic and otherwise) imposed on lawyers may 
exceed the lawyers’ compensation, indicating an externalization of transaction 
failure risk. 
IV. PATH AND PRIDE 
If opinion practice exhibits inefficiencies, one might expect the market to 
be a source of innovative correction. Professor Gilson, for example, has argued 
that in the mergers and acquisitions context, innovation will occur in the 
marketplace so long as the cost of innovation is less than the resulting gains.283 
Professor Klausner has similarly argued that the market for contract terms will 
recognize efficiency gains by standardizing certain terms.284 Yet, as discussed 
above, certain aspects of closing opinion practice appear to resist conventional 
market forces. Why might this be? 
There are doubtless many answers to this question. Interviews with lawyers 
thus far suggest two. First, closing opinion practice is highly path dependent: 
Like technological changes, developments in closing opinion practice often 
come not from the market, but from standard-setting bodies, in this case, the 
bar associations. Second, certain features of this practice appear best explained 
by reference to the larger social context in which they are given, and in 
 
281. Id. 
282. Interview with Attorney M-2, supra note 86, at 11-12. Interestingly, this attorney viewed 
Enron, or at least the Enron Examiner’s Report’s discussion of true sale issues, as having led to some of 
this stability. See id. at 11 (“[B]elieve it or not there is a great deal of guidance in the Enron reports.”). 
One lawyer explained that anxiety about closing opinions is exaggerated because “people like to worry 
themselves . . . . [They] read the Wall Street Journal and they see companies failing and opinions get 
mentioned and so it’s easy enough to worry.” Interview with Attorney W-2, supra note 56, at 15. 
283. Gilson, supra note 5, at 253. 
284. See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 117, at 761 (“When the use of a contract term becomes 
widespread, its value may rise because of several phenomena. More judicial precedents can be expected, 
on average, to enhance the clarity of the term. Common business practices implementing the term may 
become established, further reducing uncertainty. Legal advice, opinion letters, and related 
documentation will be more readily available, more timely, less costly, and more certain. Finally, firms 
may find it easier to market their securities.”). 
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particular the power dynamics found among participants in common 
transactions. The “pride” of lawyers—their investment in their professional 
status, as well as their (and their clients’) relative bargaining power—may have 
as much to do with closing opinion practice as market forces. 
A. Path Dependence 
Part of the story may simply be path dependence among both clients and 
their lawyers. Here, path dependence refers to the “lock-in” that may occur 
with respect to certain types of technologies or entitlements.285 Path 
dependence is an alternative to the market-adjusting standard economic model. 
“If such path dependence does occur,” Leibowitz and Margolis write, “it means 
that marginal adjustments of individual agents may not offer the assurance of 
optimization or the revision of suboptimal outcomes. In turn, this implies that 
markets fail.”286 
1. Plus Ça Change . . . 
Two types of change might occur in closing opinion practice. First, parties 
might agree to waive the opinion entirely if it is not cost-justified. This, 
however, apparently rarely happens (especially in financings) because “the 
people who are negotiating these transactions literally have a book in front of 
them [that] say[s] get this and they get that, and if you want to deviate from it[,] 
you are in fact forcing them above their pay level. They go to somebody 
else.”287 One lawyer explained: 
[I]t may be that the biggest thing is that we[‘]re into a tradition[,] and it’s very, very 
difficult to ever imagine breaking that tradition because the very people who ask for 
opinions [and], by and large, get them are financial institutions and others for whom 
nobody is ever going to take the chance at saying, “Oh, I don’t want to get an 
opinion in this particular situation.” What bank loan officer is ever going to say, 
“Oh, I didn’t get the opinion from the other counsel.” . . . [I]n essence, [there] is sort 
of that always basic question that our clients and everybody else asks, and there is a 
piece of this that says “[be]cause.”288 
As discussed in Part III.A above, there is some indication that parties of 
equal bargaining power will waive the enforceability opinion outside the 
lending context. Yet, in the financing context, this is rare.289 As one attorney 
 
285. See, e.g., S.J. Leibowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History, 11 J. 
L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 206 (1995) (“[A] key finding of path dependence is a property of ‘lock-in by 
historical events’ . . . especially where those historical events are ‘insignificant.’”). 
286. Id. 
287. Interview with Attorney W-3, supra note 205, at 16. 
288. Interview with Attorney S-1, supra note 87, at 1. “[T]he ultimate answer” to why lawyers 
write third-party closing opinions, one lawyer observed, “is a little bit like Tevyah: It’s tradition. It’s the 
way it’s done.” Interview with Attorney W-3, supra note 205, at 16. 
289. On whether clients have said to a lender that a borrower’s lawyer won’t offer an opinion, one 
attorney observed: “No. I think it is so well understood that it is a condition, an absolute customary 
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explained: 
[T]here is a movement afoot among some lenders who say “well, we’re not going to 
put people to the expense of giving an enforceability opinion—that’s really the 
dumbest of all the opinions.” And there is some movement afoot along those lines. 
But it’s limited. The reason is that people with the gold have—you know, it’s the 
golden rule.290 
One might also expect that changes in the credit market and loan pricing 
would affect opinion practice. Thus, if banks are looking to place credit, or a 
potential borrower is an especially attractive customer, one might think that the 
opinion would be waived or modified. Lawyers, however, say this is not the 
case. Even when a lender has “so much money [they] don’t know what to do 
with it and their lending officers can’t shovel it out fast enough,” a closing 
opinion of borrower’s counsel is usually required. 291 
Among the attorneys, the resistance to change is often equally strong: 
[U]ntil someone on high, says “this is the new form” then it’s hard for me to be the 
one to take it out. So why do I want to take it out when I know a smart client is 
going to look at it and go “gee, . . . every other law firm we use and every other 
document I see from everybody has this in it, how come we don’t have it?” . . . 
[Y]ou go down this whole pathway and you say “leave it in.”292 
A second type of change might involve modifications to the language of the 
opinion. Economic theory would predict that lawyers will agree over time to 
increasingly standardized terms in closing opinions, and in these incremental 
changes efficiencies would result. To be sure, the form and substance of closing 
opinions have changed over time. As discussed below, however, it would 
appear that the principal engines of this change have been the bar associations, 
and not the market. 
2. The Bar Associations 
To say that a practice is path dependent implies that the path started 
somewhere. In the case of closing opinions, that is a difficult point to locate. As 
discussed above, there is good reason to believe that closing opinion practice 
developed in connection with the municipal bond market in the late nineteenth 
century. But by its nature private, we have limited access to this history. At 
 
condition, I don’t think I’ve ever had that issue.” Interview with Attorney B-2 (May 7, 2004), transcript 
at 3. Another attorney, however, had a different experience: 
What usually happens is the lawyer on one side or the other says to that client, “You know, 
there is an opinion requirement here[,] and I know you’re concerned about the cost of this 
transaction and the opinion is going to add appreciatively to it.” And [on] that side of the table 
is a discussion about pros and cons and then the business people talk and they say, “Okay, 
let’s get rid of it.” And sometimes that doesn’t work because sometimes the lawyer on the 
other side says[,] “No, really got to have an opinion here.” 
Interview with Attorney K-1, supra note 102, at 2. 
290. Interview with Attorney G-1, supra note 103, at 5. As discussed in Part IV.B, infra, this may 
also be evidence of “pride” in the form of a power imbalance between clients. 
291. Interview with Attorney R-1, supra note 143, at 4. 
292. Interview with Attorney G-2, supra note 142, at 2. 
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least historically, and like much of the practice of law, opinion-writing appears 
to have developed by apprenticeship rather than through more formal 
mechanisms.293 “Office practice,” in Willard Hurst’s words, and not law 
schools—or bar associations—taught opinion writing.294 Thus, through the 
middle of the twentieth century, writing third-party closing opinions was just 
one of many functions of the business lawyer, and there was scant published 
discussion of the practice.295 
This changed in the wake of the NSMC scandal, discussed in Part II.B, 
supra, where a prestigious firm (White & Case) was sanctioned for the 
inappropriate use of third-party closing opinions. In 1973, attorney James Fuld 
argued that cases like NSMC indicated that attorneys should rationalize opinion 
practice by establishing “general principles regarding legal opinions.”296 In 
Fuld’s view, such principles should consider: 
(a) what legal opinions should ordinarily be requested and given; (b) what words 
should ordinarily be used in opinions and what those words should mean; (c) what 
assumptions may ordinarily be made without expressly listing them; and (d) what 
investigation or backup is ordinarily required before a particular opinion is given.297 
Fuld’s call was answered by the bar associations and private 
practitioners.298 In 1979, the TriBar Committee299 produced a “landmark” 
 
293. See, e.g., Donald W. Glazer, It's Time to Streamline Opinion Letters: The Chair of the BLS 
Committee Speaks Out, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 32 (prior to 1970s, legal opinion practice 
was described as "more a matter of lore than of learned analysis.") [hereinafter Glazer, Streamline]. 
294. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 303 (1950). Hurst has 
observed that first-party opinions—opinions rendered to one’s own client—became popular in the 
1850s, when business clients sought advice from litigators about issues relevant to their business 
practices. More relevant may have been the “increasing effort to use law and lawyers preventively,” 
which Hurst indicates began after 1870. Id. at 302. How and why this occurred—and whether third-party 
closing opinions were a part of that story—will have to wait for another day. 
295. In 1968, the Cleveland-Marshall Law Review published two brief pieces (one by a 
practitioner, one by a law student) on third-party closing opinions. See Gaspare A. Corso, Jr., Opinions 
of Counsel: Responsibilities and Liabilities, 17 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 375 (1968) (practitioner’s 
article); Linn J. Raney, Note, Drafting and Use of Opinion Letters of Counsel, 17 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. 
REV. 360 (1968). Despite this, in 1973, James Fuld, a prominent practitioner, observed that he could: 
find hardly any cases considering the substance and form of legal opinions; there is virtually 
no printed word on the subject in the law books or articles; so far as I know, neither the law 
schools nor the institutes for practicing lawyers consider the subject; and, unlike the 
accountants, the lawyers do not have any generally accepted principles covering opinions. 
See Fuld, Chaos, supra note 126, at 915. 
296. Fuld, Chaos, supra note 126, at 919. 
297. Id. 
298. See, e.g., Scott FitzGibbon & Donald W. Glazer, Legal Opinions in Corporate Transactions: 
The Opinion that Stock Is Duly Authorized, Validly Issued, Fully Paid and Nonassessable, 43 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 863 (1986); Scott FitzGibbon & Donald W. Glazer, Legal Opinions on Incorporation, 
Good Standing, and Qualification to Do Business, 41 BUS. LAW. 461 (1986); Donald W. Glazer & Scott 
FitzGibbon, Legal Opinions in Corporate Transactions: The Opinion on Agreements and Instruments, 
12 J. CORP. L. 657 (1987); Scott FitzGibbon & Donald W. Glazer, Legal Opinions in Corporate 
Transactions: Opinions Relating to Security Interests in Personal Property, 44 BUS. LAW. 655 (1989). 
299. As discussed in note 6, supra, the TriBar Committee was originally composed of members of 
the state, county, and city bar associations of New York. TriBar has thus been viewed (at least 
historically) as representative of interests of New York lawyers and, in particular, banks and other 
financial services businesses, which tend to be the largest consumers of these types of legal services. 
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report on opinion practice.300 Not surprisingly, the TriBar Report tended to 
reflect the customs and preferences of the New York practitioners who wrote 
it.301 Because the rest of the nation did not necessarily share these customs or 
preferences, local bar associations began to develop their own reports on 
opinion practice.302 By the late 1980’s, practitioners were “flooded with ‘too 
many’ sources of guidance.”303 “[E]ven when dealing with the same time-
honored opinion language,” an ABA report noted, “the opinion giver and the 
opinion recipient . . . may not have a common understanding of either what is 
intended by the opinion expressed . . . or what further legal or factual issues, if 
any, might be implicitly addressed by the language used.”304 
In order to reign in this continuing sense of chaos in third-party closing 
opinion practice, the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association 
appointed a committee to develop a national consensus on legal opinion 
practice. The project ultimately involved eighty lawyers, “representing a broad 
spectrum of practice and geographical area.”305 This group met from May 31, 
to June 3, 1989 in Silverado, California to “hammer out ‘a national consensus’” 
on opinion issues.306 The product of these meetings was ultimately endorsed by 
the Business Law Section of the ABA, and came to be known as the 
“Accord.”307 
The Accord did not create a standard, universal form of opinion, but rather 
sought to provide “a framework that is both sensible and fair. It has no official 
sanction and its use is voluntary.”308 The Accord created a “contractual 
mechanism” that would enable lawyers engaged in opinion practice to “bring[] 
themselves into accord on the meaning of standard opinion language and the 
work required to support it.”309 Specifically, the Accord provided “a detailed 
set of rules that defined for those who chose to adopt them how an opinion 
 
The TriBar Committee has broadened its membership to include members of the Allegheny County 
(Pa.), Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, District of Columbia, and Ontario Bar Associations, and of the 
state bars of California, Delaware, Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 
300. See Koley Jessen, P.C., Third-Party Legal Opinions: An Introduction to “Customary 
Practice,” 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 153, 159 (2001) (citing TriBar 1979 Report, supra note 6). 
301. Id. 
302. Interestingly, Hawaii was among the first state bar organizations to do so. See Raymond 
Iwamoto, Third-Party Opinion Letters, 7 HAW. B.J. 27 (Feb. 2003) (citing Borrower's Counsel's 
Opinions to Lenders, 20 HAW. B.J. 129 (1987)). 
303. See Glazer, Streamline, supra note 293, at 33. 
304. See Accord, supra note 11, at 169. 
305. Koley Jessen, supra note 300, at 160 (quoting George W. Bermant, Third-Party Legal 
Opinions, C533 ALI-ABA 1337, 1351-1352 (American Law Institute—American Bar Association 
Continuing Legal Education, 1990)). 
306. See id. (quoting George W. Bermant, Third-Party Legal Opinions, C533 ALI-ABA 1337, 
1352 (1990)). 
307. See Accord, supra note 11. As discussed therein, the Accord also contained the ABA 1991 
Guidelines. 
308. See Accord, supra note 11, at 171. 
309. See Glazer, Streamline, supra note 293, at 33. 
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letter should be interpreted, the laws it should be understood to cover, the 
factual investigation the opinion giver was expected to conduct and the 
meaning of several standard opinion clauses.”310 
Although one prominent practitioner viewed the Accord as having had a 
“profound effect on opinion practice,” it also “never caught on.”311 Part of the 
problem may have been the voluntary nature of the undertaking: if the parties’ 
lawyers did not expressly agree to adopt the Accord in full, it would not apply, 
or may not apply as it was intended to apply. Indeed, it may have produced the 
opposite of the result intended. Rather than streamlining negotiations about 
opinions, “opinion letters often became longer and negotiations . . . more 
difficult. The added complexity, however, rarely made opinion givers feel more 
comfortable.”312 
A related, perhaps more instrumental, problem was that the Accord was 
viewed as favoring opinion-givers (e.g., borrower’s counsel).313 Since this 
conflicted with the pro-recipient (e.g., lender) orientation of the TriBar 
Committee, many underlying problems remained. The Accord was, according 
to one attorney interviewed, simply too “radical” for the financial institutions 
that dominated many of the bar association committees that might have been 
involved with it.314 
[I]f you [were] creating the legal marketplace anew, it might make a lot of sense to 
have something like [the Accord]; and the lawyers who participated in that project, 
were a very high quality bunch of lawyers. I know most of them. They thought what 
they were doing made sense obviously, or else they wouldn’t have spent as much 
time as they did producing that product. But the financial institutions just said, “No. 
We want the language we’re used to, we may have to argue about what it means if 
we ever have to litigate but we’re not going to the Accord.”315 
Real cohesion would not come to opinion practice until 1998, when the 
TriBar Committee released its second major report. While “generally 
consistent” with its prior reports, the 1998 report also “reexamine[d] and 
replace[d]” its predecessor.316 At about the same time, the American Law 
Institute  developed  its  Restatement  (Third)  of  the  Law  Governing 
Lawyers,317 which was viewed as “generally compatible with the bar 
 
310. Id. 
311. Id. at 34. 
312. See id. (noting that “[o]pinion preparers recognized all too well the impossibility of stating 
everything and worried that the more they stated, the more difficult it would be to claim that something 
unstated was intended to apply anyway”). 
313. See Koley Jessen, supra note 300, at 162 (noting “it is clear from our practice that counsel to 
opinion recipients felt the Accord favored opinion givers and, as a result, such counsel objected more 
often than not to its unfettered use”). 
314. As one lawyer explained, “I think [the Accord] was such a radical departure from the kind of 
customary practice that the financial institutions just unanimously rejected it; probably without even 
focusing on . . . the specifics.” Interview with Attorney B-1, supra note 111, at 15. 
315. Id. 
316. TriBar 1998 Report, supra note 6, at 592. 
317. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95 (2000). 
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reports.”318 In addition, the ABA released its “Legal Opinion Principles,”319 
which set forth fifteen statements intended to govern opinion practice, and to 
act as “a bridge between the Restatements’ description of applicable legal 
standards and the extended discussion of legal-opinion practice in the various 
bar-association reports.”320 The reconciliation between the TriBar Committee 
and the ABA was complete with the assertion in the Restatement that the 
TriBar Report and the ABA’s Legal Opinion Principles were “the two 
‘leading’ bar-association reports” on closing-opinion practice.321 
Although it is difficult to compare bar association influence in different 
practice areas, there is anecdotal evidence that opinion writing is unusually 
susceptible to reform and innovation through these quasi-regulatory bodies. 
Today, opinion practice appears to be the subject of intense and active bar 
association input. The Business Law Section of the American Bar Association, 
the TriBar Committee, and the Business Law Sections of several states, 
including Arizona, California, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington, have 
released many detailed reports on opinion practice.322 These committees are 
often populated with attorneys who have been recognized as experts in opinion 
writing, some of whom have authored important works on the subject.323 These 
committees then routinely assess and debate opinion practice—sometimes 
heatedly. Often, they issue reports and model opinion letters for use by 
“generalist” practitioners. 
The bar associations play a complex part in closing opinion practice. They 
have become a focal point for the production and promulgation of standards 
that lawyers can meet in closing opinion practice. They exert what would 
appear to be a significant influence in the ways that lawyers conceive of closing 
opinion practice. And although the bar associations may not be the “market” in 
a traditional sense, they certainly influence market behavior in important 
ways.324 Of course, some paths may be so strong that the bar associations 
cannot change their course. The Accord, for example, apparently could not 
overcome the force of deeply ingrained New York opinion practice. 
Moreover, it is important not to overstate the role that path dependence 
plays here. Any path dependence explanation risks missing the complex 
 
318. Arthur Norman Field, Legal Opinions and the Restatement, The Law Governing Lawyers, 609 
PLI/LIT 115, 117-18 (PLI Lit. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series No. H0-003Q, 1999). 
319. Committee on Legal Opinions, Legal Opinion Principles, 53 BUS. LAW. 831 (1998). 
320. Glazer, Streamline, supra note 293, at 36. 
321. Id. 
322. Glazer lists over thirty-five different such reports in the current treatise. See GLAZER, 
OPINIONS, supra note 2, at xxv–xxxiv, xxxix–xlvi. 
323. Examples include Donald Glazer and Arthur Field, among others. 
324. See, e.g., Interview with Attorney G-1, supra note 103, at 5. As noted above, there is a sense 
among lawyers that certain of these groups—the TriBar Committee in particular—have been “captured” 
by market actors (e.g., banks) seeking to establish beneficial standards. 
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interactions between lawyers and their clients that contribute to developments 
in closing opinion practice over time. As discussed in Parts II and III, supra, we 
know that in certain respects, and under certain circumstances, closing opinion 
practices will change.325 To read bar association and other professional 
literature, one might imagine that closing opinions are generated as responses 
to transactions presented by clients, that closing opinions are, if not an 
afterthought, then at least an exogenous statement about the transaction, 
authoritative because of their independence from the transaction. As discussed 
above, however, lawyers note that closing opinions are almost always 
negotiated, and that sometimes individual transactions will change due to 
information produced in the opinion process. 
Moreover, and more generally, it would appear that closing opinion 
practice functions in a way that informs (and perhaps modifies) expectations 
over time. That is, closing opinion practice is not a static feature of transacting, 
but can shape transactions. Even though “encrusted”326 on the “checklist,” 
closing opinion practice is also a part of the “checks and balances” of complex 
transactions.327 According to one attorney, 
[The closing opinion sets forth the] rules of the game. Here is the scorecard, fit the 
box. And if you’re not going to fit the box and you’re not going to be able to do it 
so it looks like it’s going to be checked, that box will start early to tell everyone that 
it [the transaction] doesn’t fit. So, you can fix it . . . [o]r you abandon it and do 
something else that will fit.328 
B. Pride 
If closing opinion practice follows a path created or maintained, at least in 
part, by the bar associations, what explains the bar associations? One 
explanation may be “pride.” Pride is an admittedly vague term that refers to the 
loose collection of social and emotional forces that appear to influence the way 
closing opinions are written and some of the purposes they serve.329 It reflects 
 
325. There also appears to be a sort of market innovation in Europe. Several lawyers indicated that 
legal cultures that had previously viewed the U.S. division of labor with respect to closing opinions 
suspiciously are beginning to change their tune. One lawyer explained, “I asked the sophisticated 
German firms,” if they would provide enforceability opinions as to their clients. Interview with Attorney 
S-1, supra note 87, at 2. 
[T]his guy told me it was unethical . . . but, guess what, none of our clients can borrow money 
from United States banks if they didn’t provide these. So we’ve just sort of gotten to the point 
that we kind of hold our nose and say we don’t think it’s that unethical and go forward. 
Id. This may reflect the broader influence that many aspects of U.S. culture have abroad. As one lawyer 
explained, “U.S. legal practice has now pervaded other jurisdictions . . . sort of like McDonald’s 
hamburgers and Starbucks coffee.” Interview with Attorney C-2, supra note 78, at 3. 
326. Interview with Attorney W-3, supra note 205, at 16. 
327. Interview with Attorney M-2, supra note 86, at 13. 
328. Id. 
329. Theoretical discussions of this phenomenon can be found in, e.g., ROBERT MERTON, SOME 
THOUGHTS ON THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 11 (1960) (explaining that professional 
organizations do not require members to “feel altruistic . . . it only requires them to act altruistically”); 
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the assertion of self in a social setting even when doing so may produce no net 
economic gain for oneself or one’s client. 
In the case of the bar associations, pride would describe the ambitions of 
the institutions, themselves, as well as their individual members. Although a 
full-blown discussion of the bar associations is beyond the scope of this paper, 
it would appear that they have had an important, if complex, role in the 
development of modern legal practice, generally. On the one hand, the bar 
associations appear to have diminishing power to regulate law practice.330 For 
example, bar associations no longer control attorney advertising or set 
minimum fee schedules.331 While bar associations may once have reflected an 
“iron law of oligarchy,”332 they today have a weakened grip on the macro-
economics of law practice. 
On the other hand, they have had increasing influence in the continuing 
professional education of lawyers.333 The bar associations have become 
“heavily involved in developing and interpreting standards of professional 
conduct for lawyers” and also have played “significant roles in enforcing the 
standards.”334 Establishing standards for closing opinion practice is an 
important part of this effort. Thus, lawyers craft opinions “in order to be 
thorough, accurate and follow guidance provided by various bar 
associations.”335 Lawyers interviewed for this project appear to have been 
heavily influenced by the efforts of the bar associations.336 It may be that 
education—including on the manners and morals of third-party closing 
opinions—has replaced monopoly control as the modus vivendi for the bar 
associations.337 
 
ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (rev. ed. 1968); TALCOTT PARSONS, 
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34, 43-46 (rev. ed. 1964) (discussing roles that the desire for 
success, self-interest, and altruism play in professional institutional structure). 
330. See ROBERT L. NELSON & DAVID M. TRUBEK, LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 7 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., Cornell 
1992) (“[T]he profession’s associations appear increasingly irrelevant to the actual organization of law 
practice.”). 
331. Id. 
332. ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES 401 (Eden Paul et al. trans., 1949). 
333. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION (1988). 
334. Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 
193, 206, 212-13 (1996). 
335. Koley Jessen, supra note 300, at 154. 
336. Virtually every lawyer interviewed for this project was aware of the major TriBar and ABA 
efforts in the closing opinions context, and many viewed these efforts positively. See, e.g., Interview 
with Attorney M-2, supra note 86, at 21 (“[T]he ABA guidelines . . . are very highly thought of and their 
corporate governance [principles are] very highly thought of.”). 
337. Certainly, it would appear that the bar associations enable “entrepreneurial” lawyers to 
“produc[e] precedents, principles, doctrine [and] institutions” which enable lawyers to “reinforce their 
position in the market of trade services.” See Yves Dezalay, Putting Justice ‘into Play’ on the Global 
Market: Law, Lawyers, Accountants and the Competition for Financial Services 17 (unpublished 
manuscript presented at Law & Society Annual Meeting, Madison, WI, June 11, 1989) (quoted in 
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One result of the increased presence of bar associations in the development 
of third-party closing opinions has been the “expertizing” of opinions. A 
comparatively small coterie of opinion “gurus” sits on these committees, both 
at the state and national level. They apparently know one another, either 
personally or by reputation, and often collaborate on opinion-related bar 
association projects.338 These gurus are not remunerated in any direct or 
significant way for the service they provide. While there are undoubtedly many 
reasons for volunteering in this way, one reason is likely to be a kind of pride, 
both civic and personal.339 
We can also see this notion of self-expression at work more generally in 
closing opinion practice. A number of lawyers—especially those representing 
borrowers—asserted that there was a strong link between the leverage 
associated with being the financing (e.g., lending) party and the power to 
demand a third-party closing opinion from the other party’s (e.g., borrower’s) 
lawyer. This was sometimes simply chalked up to what several lawyers called 
the “golden rule.”340 As one lawyer explained, “[T]o the borrower, the money 
is essential. To the lender, sure he wants to do a deal and make some money, 
but if he doesn’t lend money to me, he can lend it to you. If I don’t get it from 
you, I may not be able to get it from anybody else.”341 
One lawyer observed that leverage also plays a role in dividing the labor in 
opinion practice: 
[I]f both sides are asked to give essentially the same opinion regarding either 
enforceability, the remedies opinion, or due authorization, etc.—there is a view that 
well, each one of us can do the due diligence and not necessarily rely on those 
client’s representations and warranties in the agreement and therefore neither of us 
will give the opinion because it would typically be mutual.342 
 
Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private Lawmaking, 18 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 423, 427 (1993)). 
338. In describing the development of the Opinions Committee of the California Bar Association, 
one attorney explained that the Executive Committee of the Section of Business Law “decided that what 
California really ought to have [wa]s a standing opinions committee [with] TriBar people without term 
limits. People who would be on . . . [are] people who are well-versed in opinions.” See Interview with 
Attorney C-1, supra note 58, at 3. 
339. One attorney explained as follows: 
The reason that I do the bar association work, and the reason I think most of us do it, is 
because, first, we like the intellectual stimulation of it, second because of the collegiality, 
working with good people, and third we’re producing something of value, but not necessarily 
in that order. 
Interview with Attorney G-1 (Dec. 5, 2005), transcript at 1. 
340. In fact, legal opinion practice reflects two distinct (perhaps contradictory) “golden rules.” One 
is, as indicated, that the financing party may have and exert the leverage to obtain an opinion, even if it 
is not economically advantageous to do so. Second, there is the almost Mosaic golden rule which says 
that an opinion giving lawyer “should not be asked to render an opinion that counsel for the opinion 
recipient would not render . . .” but should not “refuse to render an opinion that lawyers experienced in 
the matters under consideration would commonly render in comparable situations. . . .” ABA 2002 
Guidelines, supra note 11, § 3.1, at 878. 
341. Interview with Attorney H-1, supra note 152, at 5. 
342. Interview with Attorney K-3, supra note 85, at 2. 
LIPSON_PRINTED 5/10/2006  1:18:25 PM 
Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice  
 123 
Where the parties do not have equal power, however, the result may be 
different. For example, lawyers who give opinions, and those who counsel their 
recipients, were incredulous at the suggestion that the lawyer for the bank (or 
other financing party of any significance) would also provide an opinion. Even 
when it was pointed out that questions of the bank’s authority and 
enforceability should, in theory, matter to borrowers under a revolving credit 
agreement, it was simply inconceivable that the bank’s lawyers should provide 
a reciprocal opinion assuring the borrower that the bank would have the power 
and authority to make advances available in the future, as contemplated by the 
loan agreement. As one lawyer explained: 
In the lending transaction, it’s never mutual. The borrower will never receive an 
opinion from lender’s counsel [on] the lender’s obligations [under] that agreement 
to lend in the future . . . . You never get that opinion and you just rely on the 
covenant of the lender to lend under the conditions set forth in the agreement. . . . 
There are lots of historic reasons, I’m sure, but I think leverage has a lot to do with 
it. The fact [is] that this is one of the conditions that the lender has put on it and that 
makes it a condition that the borrower will accede to to get the money.343 
In short, there may be a kind of endowment effect that gives the liquid 
parties—and their lawyers—the negotiating power to demand that borrowers or 
sellers provide closing opinions, even when it may not make economic 
sense.344 Having the money gives the financing party an entitlement with which 
it does not wish to part. This leverage in the deal may be reflected in the 
distribution of opinion-writing duties. 
Leverage does not just run between parties. There is also a power dynamic 
between lawyer and client which may influence closing opinion practice. As 
discussed above, clients appear generally to have little patience with closing 
opinion problems. Yet, they do want their lawyers to issue closing opinions in 
order to see their deals consummated. One lawyer speculated that this may in 
part have explained how Enron’s law firms were induced to give closing 
opinions on questionable transactions: 
[I]f you go back to 1999 and . . . your client Enron is widely regarded in every book 
that gets published as one of the most respected companies in America, its 
accountants Arthur Andersen are regarded as one of the most respected accounting 
firms in America, and if these people tell you you need to do something in order to 
comply with generally accepted accounting principles, and you review the law and 
determine that the source of the opinion is supported by the law, I [would] give that 
opinion, you know.345 
 
343. Id. There are, to be sure, aberrant cases. In McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. 
Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1999), the Supreme Court of Texas held that counsel to a 
lender (a savings and loan association) could be liable for negligent misrepresentation for having 
incorrectly opined on the enforceability of an agreement settling a litigation with a borrower. 
344. The “endowment effect” reflects the tendency for individuals to value items more when they 
own them than when they do not. See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980). 
345. Interview with Attorney B-1, supra note 111, at 5. 
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Finally, pride refers to the professional pride that lawyers frequently say 
they take in closing opinion practice. Several lawyers said that they took 
opinion writing seriously not because they were concerned about producing 
information or incurring liability, but because it is inherent in the professional 
nature of lawyering.346 “It’s not so much liability” that concerns lawyers, one 
explained, “it’s professional pride.”347 
Another lawyer (from New York) had a similar, and similarly complex, 
view of the role that professional pride plays in closing opinion practice. “I 
think [closing opinion practice] imposes discipline because of liability,” she 
said: 
but I do not think . . . that a lawsuit is common on an opinion. I think it goes to 
doing your job well, that is[,] you are representing a client and part of the 
representation is delivering a third-party opinion or receiving one and negotiating 
one. I think, though, it imposes discipline that way and I think on reputation, it is 
both the reputation of the firm and sort of delight in the work that we do . . . . I think 
a legal opinion is pure legal work and in a transactional world, some of what we do 
is more business oriented, or you might do a great job on the legal work and a 
covenant, but have to re-negotiate it in a way that is acceptable to all the parties, not 
just you. [B]ut a legal opinion is pure you, legal thought.348 
V. CONCLUSION: FURTHER INQUIRY 
Writing third-party closing opinions is not quite like other fields of business 
law practice. When a lawyer delivers a third-party closing opinion, she is 
placing herself in harm’s way to a greater extent than in perhaps any other 
aspect of business law practice. While courts have understandably developed 
doctrinal mechanisms to limit or disperse these risks, it nevertheless appears 
that opinion-practice creates legitimate concerns for lawyers in ways that other 
features of practice (e.g., negotiating and drafting documents) do not. 
The preliminary research contained in this article suggests that there are 
both economic and non-economic explanations for this practice as it currently 
exists in the United States. As an economic matter, due authority opinions and 
certain subspecies of no-violations opinions appear to aid the due diligence 
process by compelling the best-positioned lawyer to provide this analysis. 
Closing opinion practice, with respect to these matters, distributes value-adding 
informational burdens in a way that no other transactional feature could. 
There are, however, limits to the economic explanations. It appears that 
certain common features of opinion practice are often not cost-justified, 
 
346. See Interview with Attorney G-1, supra note 103, at 14. This can border on the religious. 
“‘Duly incorporated,’ ‘duly authorized,’ ‘valid and binding,’ and the like,” one leading work observes, 
“are canonical phrases by which corporate lawyers consecrate financial transactions. Their delivery is a 
rite of closing.” See GLAZER, OPINIONS, supra note 2, § 1.4, at 14. 
347. Interview with Attorney G-1, supra note 103. 
348. Interview with Attorney S-2, supra note 99, at 10. 
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whether in themselves or because of the costs they impose on lawyers. 
Moreover, the market appears to fail, in the sense that these features of opinion 
practice appear highly resistant to negotiated modification. And, of course, 
recent scandals remind us that the obligation to provide a third-party closing 
opinion is no assurance of the probity of the client or the lawyer. This Article 
has thus argued that price theory alone cannot explain this practice. The 
attorneys I have interviewed suggest that path dependence and a kind of “pride” 
are also at work. 
Other theories may also be worth pursuing. There may, for example, be 
behavioral explanations of certain of the “irrational” features of closing opinion 
practice (i.e., the “pride” described above).349 Closing opinions may also serve 
“gatekeeping” functions, which, some argue, should apply more generally to 
lawyers.350 Indeed, virtually any theoretical approach to law may be enriched 
by application to closing opinion practice. Thus, this Article should be viewed 
not as the last, but as perhaps a first, word on third-party closing opinions. 
For those who care about how and why lawyers do what they do, there is 
much more work to be done in this arena. First, there are a number of 
interesting empirical avenues to pursue. This study has relied to a large extent 
on interviews with lawyers who have identified themselves as having an 
interest (and perhaps expertise) in opinion writing. It may be equally (or more) 
interesting to ascertain the views of non-expert lawyers (to say nothing of 
clients). Another empirical inquiry would consider more deeply the influence 
of the bar associations in this process. Does the “average” practitioner know or 
care about the most recent TriBar or ABA developments? If so, how are those 
developments used? 
Second, we have yet to develop a full and useful history of this practice. 
Given that history (or at least “tradition”) is so frequently cited as the basis for 
the existence and contours of the practice, it would be useful to have a better 
understanding of the past. It may be possible to work through older documents 
(especially from the municipal bond issuances of the late 19th century) and 
obtain a more thorough understanding of how the practice came to be. 
Third, we have no particularly good theory of liability in this context. As 
discussed in Part III, above, courts have come to curious and inconsistent 
results in this context, which may reflect a desire to protect lawyers. If, 
however, we are experiencing a larger change in the role of lawyers and legal 
opinions, then associated liability rules may also change. If the proper role of 
opinions is to produce and verify information in a cost-effective manner, then 
perhaps the predominant question should focus on that, rather than technical 
 
349. Professor Painter does a bit of this in his article about the NSMC scandal. See Painter, supra 
note 125. 
350. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 249. 
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details or other potentially extraneous matters (for instance, the client’s 
misconduct). A related question would consider the role that insurance does (or 
should) play in this context. Why has the insurance policy not displaced the 
legal opinion?351 
There is, in short, good reason to view this Article as merely a preliminary 
study. This Article has demonstrated that there is some reason to believe that 
closing opinions add economic value under certain circumstances, thereby 
bolstering traditional economic analysis. It has also shown that this analysis is 
incomplete, at least in this context. There is much more work to do here. While 
we may have begun to understand why this practice exists, we have only 
scratched the surface. 
 
351. Indeed, we might see increasing use of such policies, e.g., in the secured lending context, 
where such products as “First American’s Eagle 9 UCC” insurance policy allegedly displace the role of 
closing opinions on the perfection and priority of personal property security interests. See Eagle 9 UCC 
Insurance Policy, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.eagle9.com/faq.html (2005). First American 
explains that its product is better than a legal opinion because, among other reasons: 
First of all, the opinion of borrower's counsel is usually directed only to perfection. Our 
insurance products cover priority. Further, usually the perfection opinion is little more tha[n] 
advice that the form of the financing statements meets the particular state's requirements as set 
forth in the CCH Secured Transactions Guide. Given the fact that lender's counsel prepares the 
financing statement, the opinion is being asked of the wrong lawyer and, getting over that 
issue, is generally useless. 
Id.; see also Widen, supra note 176, at 1577, 1577 n.2. 
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APPENDIX 
A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
The empirical aspect of this project relied principally on interviews with 
twenty-seven lawyers, supplemented by email exchanges or less formal 
conversations with several others. Most of those formally interviewed 
identified themselves as having an active interest in third-party closing opinion 
practice. Most were employed at large U.S. law firms in major metropolitan 
markets (e.g., New York, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C.), although several 
were employed with smaller regional or local firms (one from Maine, one from 
Phoenix, and one from Memphis). Roughly one-third of interviewees identified 
their practices principally as counsel to opinion recipients (e.g., banks, asset 
purchasers), one-third identified their practices principally as being the opining 
attorney, and one-third indicated a blended practice. Twenty were men; seven 
were women. All but one was Caucasian (the exception was Asian). One was 
not a business lawyer at all, but counsel to a large malpractice insurer. 
Each interview lasted about an hour and was conducted from a script of 
questions I developed, which can be provided upon request. The interviews 
were all tape-recorded and transcribed. All interview participants were asked 
to—and did—sign consent forms in which, among other things, they agreed to 
be interviewed and indicated whether they would permit attribution of quotes. 
Despite the agreement to be interviewed and quoted, many asked that their 
quotes not be attributed to them. As noted in the introduction, in order to 
preserve their anonymity while also maintaining the integrity of the data, I have 
cited them by code, e.g., Interview with Attorney [A-1] (date), transcript at [].” 
Redacted transcripts of these interviews were provided to the Berkeley Business 
Law Journal. In addition to obtaining consents, I also (grudgingly) obtained 
institutional review board approvals and/or waivers from the academic 
institutions with which I was associated while conducting this research. 
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